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A NEW CONFEDERACY? DISUNIONISM
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
PAUL D. CARRINGTON
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas is seceding and we ought summon the ghost of
General Grant from his stately tomb on Riverside Drive to sup-
press it. Or at least the ghost of David Culberson, a nineteenth
century Congressman from Eastern Texas' who had a notion
about how to deal with unruly judges. The intrepid Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas armed, by the improvidence of Congress, with the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA)2 has set its face against
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 as reconfirmed by Congress in
1988,' the Fees Act of 1853,5 the Rules of Decision Act of
1789,6 three principles of constitutional law, and, of course, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme
Court of the United States! One hopes that higher courts will in
time suppress this disunionist uprising and cause Eastern Texas to
t Chadwick Professor of Law, Duke University; Reporter, Civil Rules Advisory
Committee, Judicial Conference of the United States, 1985-92. Edward Cooper and
Charles Alan Wright, as they have so often done, saved me from several errors, but are
surely not responsible for any that remain. Wayne Brazil, Dan Coquillette, Tom Metzloff
and Preble Stolz made useful suggestions. Of course, none of these persons are responsi-
ble for my heresies. Jeff Prescott and Erik Belenky helped with the documentation. Erika
King made many useful editorial suggestions. I also salute the memory of Maurice
Rosenberg, with whom I discussed these issues over three decades of joyful comradeship.
1. Culberson was born in 1830 in Troup County, Georgia. He was admitted to the
Texas bar in 1851 and practiced first in Gilmer, then in Dallas. He was elected to Con-
gress in 1874 from a largely rural district that included much of Eastern Texas. He
served twelve terms in the House of Representatives. CHARLES LANMAN, BIOGRAPHICAL
ANNALS OF THE CIVIL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DURING ITS FIRST CEN-
TURY (James Anglim 1876). Culberson was a sponsor of the Evarts Act of 1891, a mea-
sure intended to diminish the discretion of individual federal judges. See infra, at notes
30-37.
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 472-473 (1994).
3. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064.
4. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648, 4648-50
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988)).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1988).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988).
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rejoin the union of the federal judiciary, but meanwhile that court
has provided us with an unusual example of judicial mischief, and
with cause to wonder if the services of Grant or Culberson might
be needed.
At the moment, the mischief in Eastern Texas is still good
fun; few, if any, appear to have been seriously hurt. The mischief
began with a simple declaration in the court's Cost and Delay
Reduction Plan promulgated in response to the CRA that its
Plan would take precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act. National rules would apply only when the local
rules did not.7 It then included in its Plan a fee-shifting offer-of-
settlement rule8 that was substantially more coercive than Rule 68
of the Federal Rules,9 and also undertook in its Plan to regulate
7. "To the extent that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with
this Plan, this Plan has precedence and is controlling." United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Justice Cost and Delay Reduction Plan 9 (Dec. 20,
1991) (on file with author).
8. Art. 6, § 9 provides:
At the Management Conference or anytime thereafter, a party may make a
written offer of judgment. If the offer of judgment is not accepted and the final
judgment in the case is of more benefit to the party who made the offer by
10%, then the party who rejected the offer must pay the litigation costs in-
curred after the offer was rejected. In personal injury and civil rights cases
involving contingent attorneys' fees, the award of litigation costs shall not ex-
ceed the amount of the final judgment. The court may, in its discretion, reduce
the award of litigation costs in order to prevent undue hardship to a party.
"Litigation costs" means those costs which are directly related to preparing the
case for trial and actual trial expenses, including but not limited to reasonable
attorneys' fees, deposition costs and fees for expert witnesses.
9. Rule 68 provides for offers of judgment, i.e. offers of settlement to be embodied
in a court order. Its text reads:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to
be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect
specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the ser-
vice of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accept-
ed, either party may then .le the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer
not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by
the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not
accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party
to another has been determined by verdict or order of judgment, but the
amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceed-
ings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of judgment, which shall
have the same effect as an offer made before trial if it is served within a rea-
sonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commencement of hearings to
determine the amount or extent of liability.
FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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the fees paid by plaintiffs to their attorneys. On their face, these
rules seem applicable to all parties litigating in that court, whether
the claims or defenses they assert arise under federal or state law,
and whether the actions to which they are parties were com-
menced in federal court or removed there by the defendants. In a
recent decision, Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co.,
the court rejected a challenge to its coercive offer-of-settlement
rule, but held it inapplicable to plaintiffs suing to enforce the
federal Clean Water Act," lest its Plan deter a class of plaintiffs
whom Congress by that legislation wanted to encourage. It defend-
ed its Plan as one authorized by the 1990 Act despite its conflict
with recently enacted and unrepealed sections of the Judicial Code
of the United States forbidding district courts to make rules incon-
sistent with the national law. The court took no notice of -the
ancient Rules of Decision Act forbidding the displacement of
substantive state law, or of the ancient legislation limiting taxable
costs. And it gave only glancing attention to the Constitution of
the United States which, at least arguably, it violated three times
in a single breath. It concluded that it was empowered to make
any rule that might reduce cost or delay, however those phenome-
na might be defined.
Given the hubris expressed in the court's Plan, the decision
was not surprising. The case is significant because it dramatically
marks a widely observed trend 2 in the evolution, or devolution,
of the professionalism of the federal judiciary, a professionalism in
which the endangered Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
played a significant part. Unfortunately, Friends of the Earth will
not be reviewed by a higher court. So the local plan awaits future
application, most likely to litigants in diversity cases who invoke
10. 885 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
11. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 et seq.).
12. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992) [hereinafter Counter-Reformation]; Judith Resnik, Failing Faith:
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L REv. 494 (1986) (chronicling 50 years
of commentary on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting
Devolution or Bleak to The Future: Subrin's New-Old Procedure as a Possible Antidote to
Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem," 46 FLA. L. REv. 57 (1994) (detailing the "case manage-
ment" procedural philosophy of the judiciary and some reformers as flawed); Stephen N.
Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV.
1155, 1155-72 (1993) (describing the "sea change" in philosophy behind procedural rules
beginning in the 1870s).
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mere state-created rights and who are hence not exempt from the
coercive local plan.
I. THE ADVENT AND DECLINE OF PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE NATIONAL LAW
To put Friends of the Earth in perspective, a brief review of
the historical role of the U.S. District Courts is useful. It may be
recalled that until 1875, the federal trial courts were exercising
little responsibility for the enforcement of national law, in part
because there was little national law to enforce. The diversity and
admiralty jurisdictions formed the core of their business. 3 Their
procedure was fashioned locally to resemble practice in neighbor-
ing state courts, with the blessing of Congress expressed in the
Conformity Act'4 and its antecedents.' Despite the reforms of
state practice that commenced in New York in 1848,'6 nineteenth
century civil procedure was a sport of chance in which the sub-
stantive merits of claims and defenses played a minor role.17
Moreover, review by the Supreme Court of the United States"
was remote, and not only in distance, for the Court was not likely
to entertain an appeal for as many as three years or more 9 and
would entertain only a narrow range of assignments of error."
13. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT 12 (1928).
14. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, 17 Stat. 196.
15. A similar provision was first enacted in the Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1
StaL 93-94.
16. See ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORI-
CAL PERSPECTIVE 52-64 (1952); Steven N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field
Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAw & HIST. REV. 311
(1988) (describing the history of the Field Code and its progenitor).
17. Roscoe Pound, The Causes for Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 738-40 (1906).
18. A limited appellate jurisdiction was conferred on the circuit courts by the 1789
Act. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 83-85. The circuit courts
were abolished by the Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
19. The availability of the Court is described in FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 13, at 60-70.
20. See generally ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 106-321
(1941); Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEx. L. REV. 126,
139-46 (1927). For adverse comments on this evolution, see LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND
JURY 380 (1930) ("From the moment that the appellate courts became a separate organi-
zation from the trial courts, a silent and probably unconscious struggle for supremacy
began, which has resulted not only in complete subordination of trial judges but also of
juries."); Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE LJ.
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Therefore, a decision by a single judge was the terminal point for
most litigants in federal courts. Federal trial courts bore an un-
comfortable resemblance to the eighteenth century English Court
of Chancery, in which the king's Chancellor wielded unreviewed
discretionary power over the lives and properties of litigants com-
ing before him.2 Chancery cases, we recall hearing, were decided
according to the length of the Chancellor's foot.' In fact, at least
with respect to the expansive application of the contempt power,
the courts of the United States exercised even greater power than
the ancient chancellors.'
Sometimes the discretionary power of the federal trial judge
was used wisely, but it was deeply resented by many. Federal
judges in the nineteenth century, like lords of the manor, were
more feared than honored. The Judiciary Act of 187524 enlarged
their power by establishing federal question jurisdiction, so that
claims arising under the growing body of federal legislation could
be brought before a federal judge. This enactment, and the consti-
tutional provision on which it rests, reflected a presumption that
federal judges have a stronger professional commitment to the en-
forcement of the national law than locally elected state judges.
The Civil Rights Acts of 1866,5 1871,' 6 and 1875' were among
the first laws enacted by Congress with a view to private enforce-
539, 548-65 (1932) (arguing against the use of mandamus proceeding to expand the scope
of review); Charles A. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN.
L. REV. 751, 778-82 (1957) (arguing that the range of errors reviewable by appellate
courts was increasing rapidly); Charles A. Wright, The Federal Courts-A Century After
Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J. 742, 748 (1966) (arguing that the scope of appellate review
should be restricted).
21. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 918-21 (1987).
22. See TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 43 (Frederick Pollock ed., 1927). Cf Stephen
B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 31 (1988) (commenting on a
federal judge who manages his court irrespective of the Rules).
23. RONALD L. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMlrr POWER 45 (1964); see also Walter
Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COL. L. REv. 956 (1931) (dis-
cussing origins and applications of contempt power).
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The immediate impetus for this legis-
lation was The Case of the Sewing Machine Companies, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 553 (1873).
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 13, at 66--68.
25. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1988)).
26. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)).
27. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
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ment in the federal courts. But for the reasons noted, the federal
courts then existing were not well suited to such tasks; the 1875
Judiciary Act intensified the widely shared mistrust of the federal
judiciary as being arrogant and unfeeling autocrats. In those days,
removal jurisdiction was a field on which many battles were vigor-
ously fought;' lawyers for injured workmen, for example, strug-
gled desperately to keep their cases out of federal court.29
A response to this situation was the Evarts Act of 1891,30
which created the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The Act was intended
to subordinate the local potentates sitting on the benches of U.S.
trial courts. They were made a functioning part of a unified judi-
cial system designed to enforce national law evenhandedly across
the continent. The draftsman and proponent of that legislation in
the Senate was William Maxwell Evarts of New York, perhaps in
his time the most respected practicing lawyer in America.31 His
principal ally in the House of Representatives was David
Culberson, the agrarian lawyer from Texas. Some may still feel
Culberson's passion when he told his fellow Congressmen that he
had "a supreme desire to witness during ... [his] time in Con-
gress the overthrow and destruction of the kingly power" of the
federal judges.32
The legislation of 1891 had that desired effect. In achieving
the "overthrow of kingly power," it followed an established pat-
tern of American politics. The overbearing and inadequately con-
trolled conduct of the royal judges had been a grievance against
the British crown corrected by force of arms.33 Fear of unre-
28. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 104-47 (1992). One of the most
widely used law books in the nineteenth century was JOHN F. DILLON, REMOVAL OF
CAUSES FROM STATE COURTS TO FEDERAL COURTS WITH FORMS ADAPTED TO THE
SEVERAL ACTS OF CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT (1877). It went through numerous edi-
tions.
29. PURCELL, supra note 28, at 104-26.
30. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
31. Evarts was known for his successful defense of President Johnson in the im-
peachment proceeding, as an officer in the cabinets of Presidents Grant and Hayes, and
as the founding spirit of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See
CHESTER L. BARROWS, WM. M. EVARTS: LAWYER, DIPLOMAT, STATESMAN 138-79,
182-84, 311-32 (1941).
32. 21 CONG. REC. 3403, 3404 (1890).
33. E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) ("[George III]
has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the
amount and payment of their salaries."). Among the first decisions of several state consti-
[Vol. 45:929
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strained federal judicial power had animated the anti-federalists to
demand and receive ratification of the Seventh Amendment guar-
•anteeing the right to jury trial in civil cases.' In his first presi-
dential message, President Jefferson expressed his mistrust of ju-
dicial power, urging that the right to jury trial be extended to suits
in equity. 5 And it was hostility to judicial hubris that energized
the Jacksonian movement in the mid-nineteenth century to estab-
lish popular election of judges in most states. 6 Indeed, nowhere
was the resistance to judicial authority greater than in nineteenth
century Texas. Its constitution, drafted by agrarians and fugitive
debtors, provided for the election of judges to short terms; its
judges dared not wear robes or comment to the jury on the evi-
dence.' Congressman Culberson was thus not the first Texan,
nor the last, to stand in opposition to "kingly power" in the judi-
ciary.
The 1934 Rules Enabling Act38 was a political triumph of
the American Bar Association,39 not an agrarian reform; but it
too had as one goal the unification of the federal judiciary to
serve the common purpose of enforcing rights created by national
law. On that account, it enjoyed the support, indeed the zealous
advocacy, of nationalists as diverse in their politics as William
Howard Taft and Charles Edward Clark, a committed New
Dealer. The decision of the Supreme Court in 1938 in Erie R.R. v.
tutional conventions was the abolition of chancery. E.g., J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYL-
VANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776, at 196-99 (1936).
34. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). The Pennsylvania anti-federalists, for example,
prepared the most coherent statement of the reasons for opposing ratification. They gave
a prominent, if not primary, place to the threatening character of the federal judiciary re-
sulting from the failure of the Constitution to guarantee the right to jury trial in civil
cases. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 49-51 (Cecilia Kenyon ed., 1966).
35. 2 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 177 (P. Ford ed., 1985). For earlier expres-
sions of this idea by Jefferson, see 9 id. at 340; see also 5 id. at 224.
36. See DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICAN LAW 113-161 (1986). See generally MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PER-
SUASION (1957).
37. See Daffan Gilmer, Early Courts and Lawyers of Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 435
(1934); Clarence Wharton, Early Judicial History of Texas, 12 TEX. L. REv. 311 (1934).
For a discussion of populism in Texas, see generally LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRAT-
IC PROMISE (1976).
38. Pub. L No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
39. Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1043-98 (1982).
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Tompkins' pursued the closely related purpose of reinforcing the
integrity of state law4' by making federal courts accountable for
their fidelity to state law when it appropriately controls, as in
diversity litigation. 2
The discovery rules43 promulgated that same year further
elevated the law-enforcing role of the federal courts. 4 Not only
were federal courts committed to enforcing law in civil cases, but
they were assured of being more able to investigate and discern
facts in dispute than any courts had ever been. The private bar
serving as officers of the courts were commissioned to use the
courts' subpoena power to investigate a wide range of possibly
unlawful conduct.4 5
Critics doubted that the increased accuracy in the application
of the law was worth the cost to the litigants of the new methods
of investigation.' But by the mid-1960s, the federal courts had
replaced administrative agencies as the preferred means of enforc-
ing much of our national law. Unlike administrative agencies and
other political bodies in any government anywhere, the federal
courts, their juries, and the private bar serving them were almost
invulnerable to political manipulation, intimidation, or bribery in
any of their many forms.47 The federal district court was there-
fore as close to a level playing field as any public forum had ever
40. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41. For a contrasting explanation of the link, see Jack B. Weinstein, The Ghosts of
Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 19-21 (1988).
42. This responsibility was reconfirmed in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225, 227 (1991).
43. FED. R. Ov. P. 26-37.
44. Edson R. Sunderland, Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15
TENN. L. REV. 737, 738-39 (1939); cf Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Dis-
covery Before Trial, 42 YALE LJ. 863 (1934); Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Ad-
ministration of Civil Justice, 167 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 60 (1933).
45. See generally WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1968) (presenting results of extensive survey on modem discovery rules and the
effect they have had on the administration of American justice).
46. William H. Speck, The Use of Discovery in the United States District Courts, 60
YALE LI. 1132, 1132-33 (1951).
47. But compare John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 853-55 (1985) (contrasting the influence of politics in the selection
of American judges with the more bureaucratic German approach) with Samuel R. Gross,
The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734,
742-44 (1987) (arguing that adversarial discovery, while more inefficient, is nonetheless
more accurate than a nonadversarial system).
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been.' Armed with the contempt power,49 the federal courts
were indeed a daunting threat to anyone considering a possible
violation of the national law potentially injurious to the rights of
others." Law enforcement in civil cases, not mere dispute resolu-
tion, became the primary business of the federal courts. 1 Primar-
ily enforced through civil litigation were laws deterring trade prac-
tices injurious to markets in goods and fraud injurious to invest-
ment markets, laws protecting civil rights and civil liberties, and
laws protecting the environment. Whereas other countries relied
upon administrative bureaucracies to protect the public interest in
these large and important areas, America relied primarily upon its
courts because they proved to be more effective.
State courts and legislatures in most states soon perceived this
effect and replicated the federal practice in their state courts. 2
More frequently than ever before, American lawyers were giving
their clients the unwelcome advice that unlawful conduct harmful
to others would likely be detected and the law enforced. In short,
American law became surprisingly effective. This development
coincided with the steady rise in the rights-consciousness of the
American people. It also coincided with a modest expansion of the
appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Courts of Appeals. While district
courts were given more discretion to administer pretrial prac-
tice, 3 there was an erosion of the final decision requirement that
48. See Weinstein, supra note 41, at 25 (arguing that the Federal Rules spurred "an
enormous effort, almost a quantum jump, toward equality in fact").
49. The contempt power to enforce injunctions is not available elsewhere and is
generally regarded as "a legal technique which is not only unnecessary to a working legal
system, but also violative of basic philosophical approaches to the relations between gov-
ernment bodies and people." GOLDFARB, supra note 23, at 2 (footnote omitted).
50. Cf Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1281, 1292-96, 1298-1302 (1976) (surveying the changing paradigm of federal litiga-
tion, including greater use of equitable relief, prospective decrees, and contempt power).
51. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937,
938-40 (1975); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Ac-
tions, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 669, 669 & n.1 (1986).
52. "The [Federal] Rules may be Bleak House, but everyone seems to want to live
there." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Undemocratic Legislation, 87 YALE L.J. 1284, 1287 (1978)
(book review) (footnote omitted).
53. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 640-66. Yeazell observes that the increased emphasis on pretrial
practice enlarged the power of the district courts vis-h-vis the courts of appeals. That is
doubtless true, but there was in the early decades of the 1938 rules a compensatory
adjustment in the compass of appellate jurisdiction. See also Judith Resnik, From "Cases"
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enabled courts of appeals to cabin that discretion, so to ensure
that federal judgments conform to the controlling law.s' The U.S.
District Judge, although powerful, was now accountable to a de-
gree that no chancellor sitting in the high court of Chancery ever
was.
Over the last three decades, there has been a degeneration of
federal civil practice. Friends of the Earth manifests that degenera-
tion and is therefore a matter for national interest and concern.
What has degenerated is not the professionalism of individual
members of the federal judiciary, for their standards are generally
high, perhaps as high as they have ever been, but diminishing is
their collective sense that the enforcement of legal rights and
duties is their primary business. I have been among those calling
attention to various aspects of this phenomenon with the frequen-
cy of a broken record;"5 but there was nothing in my reportage
to "Litigation," LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5, 57-60 (describing this ad-
justment in the context of complex tort cases); Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System:
Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1984) (advocating increased judicial
management).
54. E.g., Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83-86 (1981); Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 342-56 (1976); Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-54 (1964); Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-12
(1964); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 501-11 (1959); La Buy v.
Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1957); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220-25 (1946);
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-96 (1943). See generally Martin H. Redish,
The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89
(1975) (discussing the final judgment rule). At one time, it was possible to say plausibly
that "an order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substantial rights of the parties
which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment may be appealed
immediately under Section 1291." United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962). Current standards of appealability are somewhat
more restrained. See generally MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS JURISDICTION
AND PRACTICE 76-81 (2d ed. 1993).
55. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL, JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976) [hereinafter JUS-
TICE ON APPEAL]; Paul D. Carrington, U.S. Courts of Appeals and U.S. District Courts:
Relationships in the Future, in THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 69 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler, eds., 1989) [hereinafter Relationships
in the Future]; Paul D. Carrington, An Unknown Court Appellate Caseload and the
"Reckonability" of the Law of the Circuit, in RESTRUCrURING JUSTICE: THE INNOVA-
TIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 206 (Arthur
D. Hellman, ed., 1990) [hereinafter An Unknown Court]; Paul D. Carrington, Crowded
Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and the Nation-
al Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges
and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969); Paul D.
Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study, 11 HoUs.
L. REV. 1101 (1974); Paul D. Carrington, Current Developments in Judicial Administra-
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that was not also being observed by many others.56 Many of the
anxieties expressed over that time are captured in the recent re-
port of the Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States.57 That Report sounds an urgent
note, foretelling an unnamed doom if something is not done.
But the sky is not falling. The federal judiciary will not col-
lapse so long as the republic stands. What is being lost is an
ephemeral quality of our national life, so ephemeral that it is easy
for those immediately engaged in professional work to overlook
the loss. The decline is directly fatal to no particular interest, but
is not without value to the public. As the courts' collective, in-
stitutional professional commitment to decide civil cases by apply-
ing law to facts diminishes, the worth of all rights, claims, and de-
fenses enforceable in those courts diminish as well. Government is
accordingly less effective and has a smaller entitlement to the
respect and loyalty of its citizens. Such ineffable losses are not the
sort to show up on a balance sheet 8 or a score card or an opin-
ion poll, but they are not less costly on that account, especially in
tion, Address Before the Plenary Session of the American Association of Law Schools
(Dec. 28, 1977), in 80 F.R.D. 147, 180 (1979); Paul D. Carrington, Ceremony and Real-
ism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A. J. 860 (1980) [hereinafter Ceremony and
Realism]; Paul D. Carrington, Perspectives on Improving the Work of Our Courts, Ad-
dress Before the Second Judicial Circuit Judicial Conference (May 9, 1981), in 93 F.R.D.
673, 735 (1982); Paul D. Carrington, Civil Procedure and Alternative Dispute Resolution,
34 J. LEGAL EDuC. 298 (1984); Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A
Late Century View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411 (1987); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Sub-
stantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv 2067 (1989) [hereinafter Making
Rules]; Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161
(1991); Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in American Law, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 297 (1993); Paul D. Carrington, William Gardiner Hammond and the
Lieber Revival, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2135 (1995).
56. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and
Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 762-80 (1993);
Resnik, supra note 12.
57. See COMMITEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995).
58. For efforts at economic analysis, see Edward H. Cooper, Discovery Cost Alloca-
tion: Comment on Cooter & Rubinfeld, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 465 (1994); Robert D. Cooter
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435
(1994); Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD.
481 (1994); Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analy-
sis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994).
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a culture relying as ours does on law as the adhesive force binding
a diverse population together.
The decline in the judicial professionalism of the federal
courts is manifested in the following ways, perhaps among others:
(1) the gradual diversion of the energies of circuit judges away
from the humdrum task of listening to arguments based on the
minutiae of appellate records for the purpose of assuring fidelity
to law, in favor of the seemingly more uplifting work of pro-
claiming new law in opinions of the court;-9
(2) the declining predictability of appellate decisions making
lawyers and trial judges less reliant on the utterances of U.S.
Circuit Judges-a decline caused by steady enlargement of the
courts of appeals without structural modification to assure coher-
ence;6°
(3) the growing preoccupation of district judges with administra-
tion, as distinct from enforcement, or, in other words, with mov-
ing cases rather than deciding them;
61
(4) the growing involvement of district judges and magistrate
judges in "managing" pretrial litigation in cases that will never be
decided on their merits,62 often to control "discovery abuse" by
counsel;6
(5) the increasing pressure placed by district courts on the parties
to civil disputes to settle their differences,' a practice until re-
59. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 55.
60. Relationships in the Future, supra note 55, at 71; Ceremony and Realism, supra
note 55, at 863.
61. Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 3. See also Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in
Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 256 (1986).
62. See also STEVEN FLANDERS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT
AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRuCr COURTS 37-38 (1977); E. Don-
aid Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306
(1986); Richard L. Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 647, 660-82 (1988); Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflec-
tions on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Pr. L.
REV. 725, 743-45 (1989); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager The
New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL L. REV. 770 (1981);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
63. For a brief account of discovery abuse, see Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2237, 2237-44 (1989) [hereinafter Vices].
64. The use of alternative dispute resolution devices such as nonbinding arbitration is
the preferred method. The most recent federal legislation promoting that technique is Act
of Dec. 14, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-92, 107 Stat. 2292 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58
(1988)). Whether courts are justified in requiring resort to such devices is subject to
doubt and much criticism. For powerful critiques, see Edward Brunet, Questioning the
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cent times regarded as unethical;'
(6) the growing practice of compelling reluctant parties, in com-
pliance with contracts of adhesion, to engage in binding arbitra-
tion of claims brought to enforce regulatory laws of the United
States and of the states;'
(7) the increasing use of joinder devices and enlarged principles
of res judicata to preclude the assertions of claims and defenses
without a full hearing on the merits;'
Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Kim Dayton, The
Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOwA L. REV. 889
(1991); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alterna-
tives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WIS.
L. REV. 893; Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, -1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359; Carrie Menkel-Mead-
ow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The
Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1991); Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented
Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph
Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059 (1991). For empirical accounts, see FREDERICK B.
LACEY, THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL SUITS (1977); E. ALLAN
LIND & JOHN E. SHEPARD, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED
ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (rev. ed. 1983); BARBARA S.
MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICTS (1990); D. MARIE
PROVINE, SETrLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DISTRICr COURTS (1986); Marc
Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settle-
ments, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Richard Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and
Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U.
CI. L. REV. 366 (1986); Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1487 (1994); Hubert L. Will, et. al.,
The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203 (1977).
65. George Wharton Pepper, a distinguished member of the Philadelphia bar and a
member of the original Rules Advisory Committee, hoped to write a rule that would
make the practice an impeachable offense. David L Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at
the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1980 n.38 (1989).
66. This has resulted from a transformation of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988) stemming from a reinterpretation of the Act by the Supreme
Court in opinions written since 1967. See generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBI-
TRATION LAW 134-47 (1992).
67. Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
104-118 (1989); Linda S. Mullenix, Class Actions, Personal Jurisdiction, and Plaintiffs' Due
Process: Implications for Mass Tort Litigation, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 871, 887-908
(1995); Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Pow-
er of Courts, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 227; Resnik, supra note 53, at
5; Peter Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Exam-
ple, 53 U. CHI. L . REV. 337, 341-48, 362-65 (1986); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice:
The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L
REV. 1683, 1783-89 (1992).
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(8) the halving of juries in most districts, making juries more
prone to render idiosyncratic verdicts;s
(9) the proliferation of delegates performing judicial work in all
federal judicial chambers to include magistrate judges, bankruptcy
judges, special masters, court-annexed-arbitrators, mediators,
neutral evaluators, law clerks, interns, externs, and other go-fers,
with the result that judges at all levels are in danger of becoming
mere trademarks for the professional work of others; 9 and
(10) the proliferation of local rules, standing orders, plans and
other like instruments reflecting claims to local autonomy."
I do not here contend that any one of these trends standing
alone ought be viewed as a serious threat to due process of law.
For example, court-annexed mediation can, if so used, facilitate
definition of the issues to be litigated, and so reduce the need for
discovery and improve the quality of trials. But as generally ob-
served in practice, all of these developments manifest a measure of
disregard for accuracy in applying law to facts in the resolution of
civil disputes, or, as Judith Resnik has put it, a "failing faith."'"
A lost horizon in this grasp for readier resolutions of disputes is
that for most disputes the best means available to induce economy
and peaceful resolution is to assure prompt and accurate appli-
cation of "reckonable" law to detectable facts: Parties who share a
foresight that judgment will soon be rendered on the law and facts
settle. As the legal process is made less decisive and less predict-
able, private settlement is impeded by differences in the forecasts
being made by the adversaries.72 Mediation may sometimes help
68. Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in
Civil Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 24-35 (1993); Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh
Amendment Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 51-56; see also
George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U.
CaL. LEGAL F. 161. The Civil Rules Committee has published for public comment a
proposal to restore the 12-member jury.
69. See Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2131-32, 2174 (1989) (discussing the increased use
of masters, magistrates, and arbitrators).
70. Daniel R. Coquillette et al., The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989);
John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2059, 2060 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Proce-
dural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2000-01 (1989); Carl Tobias, More Modem Civil
Process, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv. 801, 812 (1995).
71. Resnik, supra note 56, at 494. Charles Alan Wright's term is "malaise." Charles
A. Wright, Forewor& The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 1 (1994).
72. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Cases for Trial, 13 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1, 4 (1986).
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to diminish those differences, but mediators can build their bridges
only so far.
All these things considered, the office of the U.S. District
Judge is strikingly different from the office held by his or her
predecessors only three decades ago. The conscious mission of
many district judges is less to make decisions applying law to the
facts, and more to preside over the manufacture of dispositions.
The primary judicial labor is not trial, but conferring with lawyers
and staff.73 District courts' results are evaluated less rigorously
than once they were by the courts of appeals, but more rigorously
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.74 The courts of
appeals are increasingly remote and less known to the judges
whose work they review75 and hence less a presence in the daily
routine and work of district judges. District judges have thus
steadily gained discretion and individual power at the expense of
the authority of circuit judges. The Supreme Court of the United
States is increasingly like Tolstoy's generals,76 who uttered com-
mands obsolete by the time given, erratically transmitted down the
chain of command, and infrequently obeyed. Partly because of the
increase in their unreviewed discretion, district judges have at the
same time gained power over individual civil litigants and their
counsel. In short, the district judge is each year less a judge of a
law court and more a local chancellor or lord of the manor, more
to be feared and less to be respected.
I will not burden the reader with my attempt to understand
all the causes of this devolution. Like much social change, it is the
product of a march of events to which there is no human drum-
mer. The causes of those events are numerous and complex. Many
are associated with growth in the size of the courts unaccompanied
73. Resnik, supra note 62, at 380.
74. Robel, supra note 61, at 3.
75. See Yeazell, supra note 53, at 643-44; An Unknown Court, supra note 55, at 209;
see also Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 541 (1989).
76.
[Ilt was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle, for none of his
orders were executed and during the battle he did not know what was going on
before him.... [The battle] occurred independently of him, in accord with the
will of hundreds of thousands of people who took part in the common action.
It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his will.
LEO ToLsToy, WAR AND PEACE 876 (Aylmer Maude & Louise Maude trans., Simon &
Schuster 1942) (1865). For an elaboration of this concern, see Relationships in the Future,
supra note 55, at 76.
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by modifications needed if the legislative purposes of 1891 and
1934 were to be preserved. An odd feature is that the devolution
has occurred during a time of rising expectations of rights, or
increasing "rights talk" as Mary Ann Glendon would have it;77
thus, unlike most adaptations in legal and political institutions, this
one has cut against the grain of the culture of which it is a part.
II. PROCEDURAL LOCALISM
In reversing the ancient tradition of localism in federal civil
procedure, the rulemakers of 1938 did not attempt to standardize
all aspects of federal civil practice. The Rules did not deal at all
with admission to the bar of the district courts, or with the disci-
pline of lawyers.78 On that account, Rule 83 authorized the mak-
ing of local rules "not inconsistent" with the national rules. It was
expected that the Rule "would [otherwise] be used only on rare
occasions when the Civil Rules deliberately had left gaps to be
filled in the light of recognized local needs[, such as the setting of
motion days]."79
Within the range of matters addressed by the Rules, abundant
provision was made for the exercise of prudent discretion by the
trial judge.8" It was the aim of the draftsmen to guide the district
courts, but not so to restrict them with procedural requirements
that judgments would be rendered on the basis of procedural
miscues rather than substantive merits.81 Simplicity in the adjec-
tive law was an important aim.' The broad command of the
77. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK (1992).
78. Whether disciplinary practices should vary from one district to another remains a
mooted question. See Amy R. Mashburn, A Clockwork Orange Approach to Legal Ethics:
A Conflicts Perspective on the Regulation of Lawyers by Federal Courts, 8 GEO. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 473, 473 (1995). This matter is now on the agenda of the Standing Commit-
tee on Rules of the Judicial Conference.
79. See 2 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3152 (1990).
80. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 655 (1971).
81. See Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297, 319
(1938); see also Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in
Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 953-55 (1990). But see David M. Trubek, The
Handmaiden's Revenge: On Reading and Using the Newer Sociology of Civil Procedure,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 111, 117.
82. Janice Toran, 'Tis A Gift to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89
MICH. L. REv. 352 (1990); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Proce-
dural Outlook. The Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES
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Rules to the district judges was to decide cases on the law and the
facts, with minimal preoccupation with procedural niceties such as
those making sport of nineteenth century and earlier civil practice.
A paradigmatic rule was Rule 52, which provided that a court of
appeals may reverse a trial court's finding of fact only if it is
"clearly erroneous"; the beauty of this rule is that it leaves little
room for argument about procedure and directs the court to ad-
dress the substantive merits at issue.'
Because the Rules favored procedural discretion as a means
to achieve substantive accuracy, it was expected that litigation
would proceed somewhat differently from one case to the next
according to the needs of the situation; a necessary consequence of
this flexibility was that the process would also differ from one
federal courtroom to another, according to the tastes, instincts, and
talents of individual judges. There was not in the 1938 Rules any
notion that one size fits all; uniformity was an aspiration, not an
overriding concern.' But no one associated with the reforms of
the 1930s envisioned that there would be differences in procedure
from one judicial district to the next; in that sense, it is accurate
to say that the 1934 Act envisioned "hierarchically dictated unifor-
mity.
,,
There were in 1938, as now, differences amongst the ninety-
four federal districts.' The "productivity" of some judges or
groups of judges is greater than that of others. The civility of
lawyers is greater in some communities than others. The willing-
ness and ability of litigants to spend one another into oblivion is
greater in some places than others. Yet the primary task of each
EDWARD CLARK 115, 134 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991). Maurice Rosenberg was perhaps
the most recent member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules who was an active
champion of this value. He urged that for every word added to the Civil Rules, a word
should be deleted. The Rosenberg rule was observed in the 1991 amendments to the
Rules, but was paid little heed in the 1993 round. Alas, complexity has a bright future.
83. See Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resourc-
es of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645, 645-46 (1988); Martin B. Louis,
Adjudicative Decision-Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified
View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.
L. REV. 993 (1986).
84. See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1973, 1993-94.
85. Yeazell, supra note 53, at 672-73 n.134; cf. Counter-Reformation, supra note 12,
at 401 (arguing that in the CIRA, Congress sought to confer rulemaking power on local
citizens' groups).
86. Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the Balkanization of Civil Procedure, 24
ARIZ. ST. LU. 1393, 1413 (1992).
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federal court is essentially the same in all districts, and the differ-
ences among them seldom suggest reasons for material differences
in the procedure employed in different districtsY There was and
is no good reason why the rules of pleading should be different
from one district to the next; the same is also true for rules gov-
erning the manner of serving process, the number or length of
depositions, the scope of the lawyers' subpoena power, the number
of jurors or the manner of their selection, the evidence admissible
at trial, the form and content required of summary judgment mo-
tions, or other matters addressed in the Civil Rules. One wishing
to confirm this might review a randomly selected score of the
ninety-four local plans promulgated under the CJRA or the pre-
existing local rules; while there are differences in the plans and
local rule sets, those differences seldom, if ever, reflect variations
in local conditions. What they reflect are differences in the styles
and values of particular groups of judges. The features of the local
cost and delay reduction plan at issue in Friends of the Earth, for
example, have nothing to do with local conditions in the federal
courthouses of Eastern Texas, and everything to do with the tem-
peraments of a particular group of judges and their estimation of
events and relations found outside the court. Likewise there are
no differences in local conditions to explain local rules "determin-
ing the balance between 'free press' and 'fair trial' concerns, dis-
missing cases for failure to prosecute and interrogating jurors after
verdict."' As Geoffrey Hazard has said, "[L]ocal rules can best
be described as measurements of the chancellors' feet." 9 In this
respect, national uniformity as a brake on localism is a safeguard
against "the tyranny... of willful renegades."'
There are housekeeping matters that vary from one district to
the next; many such matters are considered to be too trivial to be
the subject of a national rule to which obedience is commanded
by the Supreme Court.9" If, however, a matter is too trivial to be
87. Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 380; Lauren K. Robel, Fractured Proce-
dure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1483-84 (1994).
88. Steven Flanders, Local Rules in Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation, or
Information?, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 213, 219 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
89. Hazard, supra note 52, at 1286.
90. Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity,
50 U. PrIT. L. REV. 853, 860 (1989); see also John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2059, 2060 (1989) (describing local rules as "the product of sheer arrogance and
irresponsibility").
91. See Flanders, supra note 88, at 261-69; Steven Flanders, In Praise of Local Rules,
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in a national rule, it is not clear why it should be the subject of
any "rule" at all. In part, this is a matter of nomenclature: "Local
rules" often include matters that the court uttering them does not
expect to enforce judicially. For example, if the clerk's filing cabi-
nets are built for eleven-inch paper, lawyers and parties must be
informed that fourteen-inch documents may not be filed, and must
be done over on shorter pages.9 However, transmissions of such
"local knowledge" 93 need not take the form of a command; they
take that form chiefly because courts are accustomed to speaking
only in the imperative voice. Local rules dealing with housekeep-
ing in the clerk's offices are therefore dispensable. 94
Indeed, it is not clear why some of the housekeeping practices
that are the subject of local rules should be different from one dis-
trict to the next. What purpose is served if filing cabinets of differ-
ent sizes are used in different federal courthouses? The absence of
an answer to such questions is the source of the new and arguably
oxymoronic concept of the "uniform local rule." For some purpos-
es, what may be needed is a standard operating manual available
to anyone dealing with federal clerks of court; such a manual need
not be written in the imperative voice of rules, yet would serve to
ease the task of the stranger appearing for the first time in a
particular federal courthouse.
While there are no visible benefits to most local rules, their
vices are obvious. Local rulemaking dealing with matters that are
also the subject of national rules is in almost every instance at
odds with the primary aims of the Rules Enabling Act. Localism
creates legal clutter-that is, background noise making it harder to
hear important commands expressed in rules that will be enforced
by appellate courts. Legal clutter is the enemy of simplicity; the
more such material is placed in the hands of parties and lawyers,
the more billable hours will be expended, but the less well read
62 JUDICATURE 28, 30-31 (1978).
92. It does not follow, of course, that the clerk's office needs the power to refuse to
accept as timely a filing that is on paper of the wrong size. See advisory committee's
notes to the 1991 amendment to FED. R. CIV. P. 5.
93. See generally CLEFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETATIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983) (describing general issues from different local
perspectives).
94. Cf Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules,
46 MERCER L. REv. 757 (1995) (positing that the proliferation of local rules creates
problems in the management of civil litigation).
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and well understood the real rules will be, and the more likely
that litigation will digress from the merits to satellite controver-
sies.9' Legal clutter will be diminished by a new provision in Rule
83 taking effect in 1995, which protects parties from suffering a
loss of substantial rights for nonwiliful violation of a local rule,'
but this provision will not stem the flow of new clutter issuing
forth under the auspices of the CJRA.
Such legal clutter gives undue advantage to cognoscenti. Nor-
mally, these will be local lawyers who are given an advantage over
counsel from other districts. But clutter also favors the expert
litigator over the lawyer making episodic appearances in court.
The 1934 Rules Enabling Act was at pains to reduce such advan-
tages.' As clutter increases, the cost of legal services is also in-
creased by a diminution of competition and retention of redundant
counsel.
Theoretically, elaborate local rules and plans could also im-
pede the objective of the national rules to confer discretion in
individual district judges that they might decide cases on their
merits. This would be so if local rules were rigorously enforced to
cabin the discretion of district judges who are out of step with
their colleagues on the same bench. I have, however, been unable
to find a single case in which a judgment was reversed because a
district judge disregarded a local rule; a characteristic of local
rules, as distinct from national rules, is that those who make them
have no means to compel compliance. In contrast, there are nu-
merous cases in which judgments have been reversed on appeal on
the ground that the enforcement of a local rule resulted in injus-
tice too great to be tolerated." At least two circuits have de-
95. John P. Frank made this point in other terms in JOHN P. FRANK, AMERICAN
LAW: THE CASE FOR RADICAL REFORM 86-90 (1969). For a recent elaboration of this
concern, see Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An
Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN's L REV. 1,
5-7 (1994).
96. "A local rule imposing a requirement of form shall not be enforced in a manner
that causes a party to lose rights because of a nonwillful failure to comply with the
requirement." FED. R. CIv. P. 83(a)(2).
97. Senator Thomas Walsh powerfully resisted enactment of the Rules Enabling Act
for this reason. He mistrusted the American Bar Association as elitist and favored "the
one hundred who stay at home as against the one who goes abroad." Burbank, supra
note 39, at 1064 (citation omitted).
98. E.g., World Thrust Films, Inc. v. International Family Entertainment, Inc., 41
F.3d 1454, 1456-57 (11th Cir. 1995) (S.D. Fla. R. 16.1); Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885
F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 1989) (C.D. Cal. R. 2.1); United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d
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dared that they will not sustain a dismissal for mere failure to
comply with a local rule.99 Friends of the Earth is one among a
number of cases in which individual judges have found reason not
to apply seemingly applicable local rules."° Perhaps a judge who
was notoriously defiant of a local rule would attract the use of the
supervisory power of the courts of appeals, °' but I have been
unable to imagine a local rule that would warrant the use of such
extraordinary appellate jurisdiction.
Consideration of the problem of securing compliance with
local rules by individual judges suggests the wisdom of the 1938
approach to procedural discretion. The realists who wrote the 1938
Rules recognized that judges, especially Article III judges, can be
compelled to conform to the purposes of procedural rules only if
the rules are cast in indeterminate language expressing elastic
principles, leaving it to appellate review to control judicial behav-
ior departing from the broad pattern fixed by their proposed
Rules. "Tight will tear; Wide will wear"" was the sartorial wis-
dom applied by the draftsmen who hoped to effectively contain
and direct judicial discretion by broadening the channel in which it
runs. 3 Those who have since participated in amending the rules
have sometimes practiced another homely wisdom, that of putting
sidewalks where the people have made paths."°
Despite its shortfall in benefits, localism in federal procedural
matters has had something of the tenacity of original sin. Localism,
as Charles Alan Wright said in 1966, is the "'soft underbelly' of
federal procedure."'0 5 In the decade beginning in 1938, there was
725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982).
99. Hargrett v. Pledger, No. 94-3289, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 8890, at *2 (8th Cir.
Apr. 19, 1995); Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Boyd-
Richardson Co., 650 F.2d 147, 149 (8th Cir. 1981).
100. E.g., Manshack v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 915 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1990).
101. Cf. La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259-60 (1957) (finding that
supervisory control of the district courts is necessary to proper judicial administration);
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (reversing the trial court based on
the Court's power of supervision over the administration of justice).
102. FRANCIs LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 195 n.6 (William G.
Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880).
103. This feature seems to be a demerit in the minds of some contemporary observers
who may fancy that district courts could be made to enter correct judgments if only the
procedural rules were drawn tightly enough. See Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Dis-
cretion: The Supreme Cour4 Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693, 715-16 (1988); Subrin, supra note 21, at 992-1002.
104. See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1992.
105. Comment, The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District Courts-A
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a visible reluctance of some district judges to obey the rules, espe-
cially Rule 8, which declared that a plain, simple statement of a
claim was sufficient to withstand an attack on pleadings. That rule
was a well-considered effort to terminate the wasteful investment
of time and judicial energy in bickering over the sufficiencies of
parties' pleadings.1t 6 To this day, federal judges have continued
to defy Rule 8,17 to the distress of the courts of appeals.. and
of the Supreme Court, which found occasion again in 1993 to say
that Rule 8 means what it says.0 9 Sometimes district courts have
expressed their preferences in these matters through local rules
imposing elevated pleading requirements on particular classes of
cases.
110
With respect to this endemic localism, the Supreme Court of
the United States made an epic blunder in 1972 when it held that
the two district judges in Montana could by local rule reduce the
size of juries in their court from twelve to six."' The local rule
in that case was at odds with Rule 48 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure then in force;"2 violated the cautionary language
of the Rules Enabling Act;" 3 and without apparent thought, dou-
bled the effect of the peremptory challenges provided in the Judi-
cial Code"4 and arguably violated the Seventh Amendment."5
Survey, 1966 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1012 (quoting Letter from Professor Charles A. Wright to
the Duke Law Journal (Nov. 16, 1965)); see also 12 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152 (1973 & Supp. 1994).
106. Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOwA L. REv. 272, 279-82 (1942).
107. See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 436 (1986) ("[Flederal courts are insisting on
detailed allegations more and more often, particularly in securities fraud and civil rights
cases.").
108. See e.g., Cook & Nichol, Inc. v. Plimsoll Club, 451 F.2d 505, 506-07 (5th Cir.
1971).
109. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163 (1993).
110. See e.g., S.D. GA. LOCAL RULE 9.1; S.D. W. VA. LOCAL RULE 8.
111. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 151 (1972).
112. Rule 48 then authorized juries of less than 12 by agreement of the parties. Rule
47 also assumed a jury of a fixed size of 12 in establishing a method for selecting alter-
nate jurors-a system quite useless if the jury can be less than 12. FED. R. Civ. P. 47,
48 advisory committee's note.
113. The 1934 Act contained the following proviso: "[t]hat in such union of rules the
right of trial by jury as at common law . . .shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
114. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1994)). See generally JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY
SELECTION PROCEDURES 145-60, 166-69 (1977).
115. See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Re-
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Because the Court could tolerate a rule as innovative as that in-
voked in Montana, the sky seemed to be the limit of local
rulemaking power.
By the mid-1980s, the legal clutter created by local rules had
become an impediment to the practice of law, a source of cost and
delay, and a significant trap for the unwary.116 Some local rules
were redundant to the national rules; some were paraphrases of
national rules; some were in conflict with national rules; and in
many districts, it was not easy to know what the current local
rules were. Some district courts purported to vest a power of en-
forcement in the clerk of court, so that one way to discover a
local rule was to have the clerk refuse an instrument for filing.
117
In response to widespread complaints at the bar and in Congress,
the Judicial Conference of the United States established that the
Standing Committee would prepare a plan aimed at reducing the
growing mass of rules."' And the Judicial Improvements Act of
198819 revised the 1934 Rules Enabling Act for the purpose of
stemming the tide of proliferating localism.'" Specifically, the
Act required local rules to undergo the scrutiny of the judicial
councils of the relevant circuits and re-established the require-
ment that local rules be affirmatively consistent with national
flections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33.
116. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 117-37
(1977); David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: Federal
Civil Rule 83 and District Court Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 537,
540 (1985). For earlier reviews of the emerging problem, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 105, at 217; see also Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 1251, 1259-63 (1967); The Local Rules of Civil Procedure in the Federal District
Courts-A Survey, supra note 105, at 1012.
117. Janet Napolitano, A Comment on Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2063, 2063
(1989) (commenting on article by Stephen N. Subrin in same issue). "Only a party who
has been sent away from the clerk's office without being allowed to file a complaint on
the last possible day because it was punched with two holes, not three, can fully appreci-
ate the injustice that supposedly benign local rules can cause." Id.; cf. Loya v. Desert
Sands Unified School Dist., 721 F.2d 279, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing the dismissal
of a complaint filed just before expiration of the statute of limitations on the wrong size
paper).
118. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67 (1984).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (1988).
120. H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 5989.
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1).
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rules,"z a provision effectively superseding Rule 83 which con-
tained the double-negative requirement that local rules be "not
inconsistent" with national rules. The 1988 legislation remains the
law, and an amendment to Rule 83 to conform it to the 1988 Act
became effective December 1, 1995.1'
III. TiE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM AcT
On the heels of the 1988 legislation came the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, from which Friends of the Earth claims to
derive authority for its deviant local plan. The origins and legisla-
tive history of that Act have been adequately recounted else-
where,24 but a brief review seems required as a predicate to my
extended argument regarding the Act's meaning. It was virtually
the sole handiwork of Senator Joseph Biden, then the chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Precisely what aroused the Senator's
interest in civil procedure is uncertain,"z but the level of that
interest was suddenly elevated in 1989.
The Senator was mindful of two decades of grumbling about
alleged discovery abuse."2 The allegations had been much stud-
ied; there was a problem, but a much smaller one than some sup-
posed. Discovery was seldom abused in cases involving smaller
stakes, or by lawyers working for contingent fees. Abuse was
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) ("Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress
and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title.").
123. The proposal was sent to the Supreme Court in 1993, 114 S. Ct. 397, 417-18
(1993), and was promulgated by the Court on April 27, 1995, 115 S. Ct. 643, 646 (1995).
124. See generally Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 375-407; Robel supra note
87, at 1450-54.
125. The Senator's general aims are explained in Joseph R. Biden, Equal Accessible,
Affordable Justice Under Law: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 1 CORNELL J. LAW
& PUB. POL'Y 1 (1992).
126. See generally Frank L. Flegal & Steven M. Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in
Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (reviewing the discovery
reform that has taken place since 1976 and assessing the need for further change); Vices,
supra note 63 (arguing for a trans-substantive approach to procedural reform); Thomas
M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for
Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991) (recommending greater resource allocation to curb dis-
covery abuse rather than continued rule revision); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disar-
ray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Un-
founded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (examining the myths of discovery
abuse and how they have informed the civil justice reform efforts of the early 1990s);
Maurice Rosenberg, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REV. 579 (critiquing the rule changes proposed by the ABA's special commit-
tee and examining alternatives).
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found in a limited number of larger cases in which lawyers, in an
excess of adversary zeal, sometimes used discovery devices to
harass and burden their opponents.' The problem was thus in
part one of professional ethics." Among the causes of the prob-
lem were exponential growth in the quantity of documentary re-
cords awaiting discovery, the perhaps improvident acceptance in
the 1940s and 1950s by clients of the practice of paying lawyers by
the hour, the professional misconduct of some lawyers bilking their
clients by milking their cases, 29 a tendency of corporate manag-
ers to postpone hard decisions or leave them for their successors
while paying large fees to lawyers to keep litigation going, and
heightened prosperity enabling many businesses to hire lawyers to
engage in misuse of discovery.
There was also some complaining about the general cost of
civil litigation of which the Senator was likely aware, but much of
it may have been a response to the discovery problem.3 No one
has yet attempted to analyze or even to depict other excessive
costs. It is, however, a fact that civil trials in federal courts have
been growing longer, and thus more expensive. While the median
127. See PAUL R. CONNALLY ET AL, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGA-
TION PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); DANIEL SEGEL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON
DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PRE-
FERRED REFORMS 10-11 (1978); JOHN SHAPARD & CARROLL SERON, FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL CENTER, ATTORNEYS' VIEWS OF LOCAL RULES LIMITING INTERROGATORIES
(1986). See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effective-
ness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980) (dis-
cussing litigators assessment of discovery system and arguing that much of the abuse of
the discovery process occurs in larger cases); Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character
of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978)
[hereinafter Civil Discovery] (discussing how the adversarial nature undermines the pur-
pose of the discovery process, contributing significantly to the cost of litigation); Maurice
Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480 (1958)
(recommending effective discovery sanctions to curb abuse).
128. Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in
LAWYERS, "IDEALS/ LAWYERS," PRACnCES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LE-
GAL PROFESSION 230, 241 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (discussing briefly the
interface between professional ethics and discovery abuse).
129. Civil Discovery, supra note 127, at 1314-15 (discussing economic temptation of
lawyers being paid by the hour to protract and complicate discovery); William W.
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITr.
L REV. 703, 710 (1989) (discussing attorney self-interest resulting in over-discovery so
long as clients will pay or costs can be imposed on the opposing losing party).
130. See, e.g., Order Amending the Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997,




length of a trial was one day in 1950, it is now at least twice that,
and many more federal civil trials now occupy a week or longer of
the court's time.'31 This in part reflects a change in the subject
matter of the civil docket in federal courts, but another likely
cause of this increase has been the use of opinion testimony that
sometimes adds substantial complexity to matters in dispute. 32 A
whole new industry has been created since 1970 to soak up bil-
lions of dollars of expenses incurred in the compensated time of
the experts and the lawyers who prepare and examine them.
Whether this profligate use of opinion testimony has enhanced the
quality of decisions has seldom been examined;3 3 it is a question
I am not prepared to address here. Despite the development of
this costly practice, the meager empirical evidence suggests that
there had been little, if any, increase in the real cost of most liti-
gation." Perhaps for that reason, the CJRA did not address the
problem of the length of trials or the excessive use of opinion
testimony.
The law's delay is a problem endemic to all systems of dis-
pute resolution. 35 Disputants have long complained of it, proba-
bly since the time of Hammurabi."6 Measured by the elapsed
131. Compare JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1950 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 164 [hereinafter 1950 ANNUAL REPORT] (listing the length of civil and criminal
trials completed in 86 U.S. District Courts during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1950)
with JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 217 [here-
inafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT] (The comparison suggests that the percentage of trials of
10 days or longer quadrupled from 1% to almost 4%.).
132. See Anthony Champaign et al., Expert Witnesses in the Courts: an Empirical
Examination, 76 JUDICATURE 5 (1992).
133. See Deborah Hensler, Science in the Court: Is There a Role for Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 171 (1991) (considering
whether and how ADR can contribute to the improvement of court procedures dealing
with scientific questions); Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of Galileo, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 119 (1991) (discussing the historical use and effect
of expert witnesses in cancer and cerebral palsy cases).
134. See generally David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 72 (1983) (presenting a national study of federal and state courts of
litigation expenditures).
135. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69
B.U. L. REv. 527, 527 (1989). See generally HANS ZEISEL ET AL, DELAY IN THE COURT
19-24 (1959) (discussing the history of court congestion).
-136. "[I]n the third millennium before Christ men were complaining about the ineffi-
ciency of legal procedure, and I fancy that if any of you are destined in the year 7000
A.D. to revisit.. . you will be obliged to report ... that mankind still exhibits the
same discontentment with its methods of adjusting human differences .... " LEARNED
HAND, THE DEFICIENCIES OF TRIALS TO REACH THE HEART OF THE MATTER (1921)
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median time between the joinder of issue and the date of trial,
delay in the federal courts has significantly increased since 1950
(when it may have been at an all-time low), but most of the in-
crease in delay occurred before 1970.137 Moreover, the elapsed
time between filing of an action and disposition has diminished
markedly, perhaps as a result of more managerial judging that
pushes parties to settle. 3 The problem of delay is not evenly
distributed among the ninety-four districts. At least one district,
the Eastern District of Virginia, has achieved a reputation for its
"rocket docket" that disposes of all civil cases with remarkable dis-
patch,139 whether at some possible cost to the quality of its dis-
positions, I do not know. On the other hand, some districts most
heavily affected by the war on drugs may have difficulty in finding
time to try civil cases. That seems the most likely cause for the
longer delay in getting civil cases to trial. There is also an expo-
nential increase in civil actions brought by prisoners against the
corrections systems reflecting in part the exponential increase in
the number of Americans in prison;"4 while these cases seldom
result in trial, they make exigent demands on the time of the
reprinted in 3 ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LECTURES ON
LEGAL TOPICS 87, 89 (1926).
137. In fiscal year 1950, the median elapsed time in getting to trial was 6.7 months.
1950 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 131, at 156. In 1970, the period was 12 months. JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 260 [hereinafter 1970
ANNUAL REPORT]. In 1992, it was 15 months. 1992 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 131, at
226.
138. In fiscal year 1950, the median time from filing to disposition was 11.2 months.
1950 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 131, at 152. In 1970, the period was 10 months. 1970
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 137, at 245(i). In 1992, it was 8 months. 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 131, at 208.
139. See Quick Response to Defense's Causation Attack Pays Off for Plaintiff in
Tylenol Case, INSIDE LITIGATION, December 1994, at 9.
140. Since 1988, the number of federal prisoners has doubled to about 100,000. FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE BUREAU 5 (1993). See
generally BARBARA S. VINCENT & PAUL J. HOFER, FED. JUDICIAL CENTER, THE CON-
SEQUENCES OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS: A SUMMARY OF RECENT FIND-
INGS (1994) (describing prison growth attributable to sentencing under the federal manda-
tory minimum sentencing statutes).
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), seems certain to double or triple the present number.
Senate Crime Bill Will More Than Double American Prison Population by Year 2005,
CORRECTIONS DIGEST, 1994, at 1-4; Peter J. Benekos & Alido V. Merlo, Three Strikes
and You're Out: The Political Sentencing Game, 59 FEDERAL PROBATION, 1995, at 6-7.
In California, similar provisions quadrupled the state prison population between 1980 and
1992. Id.
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federal judges.'4' Overall, however, delay in U.S. District Courts
is significant, but not critical; the civil dockets in many state courts
are worse, 42 as are the dockets of U.S. Courts of Appeals."
In addition to expressions of grief about cost and delay, it
also became fashionable to complain of "hyperlexis,"'" the ex-
cessive use of litigation to solve problems. There are, it is true,
more filings of civil actions in federal courts per capita than there
were three decades ago. The growth is at least in part a response
to laws enacted by Congress, such as the statute at issue in Friends
of the Court.'4 It may also reflect economic conditions enabling
more business firms to spend more freely on litigation costs in
routine contract disputes."4 It is also possible that some legisla-
tion lends itself to the assertion of unfounded claims; federal secu-
rities law may have been an example. 4 It is also likely that the
advent of lawyer advertising has elevated claim-consciousness and
increased case filings in the personal injury field. And the use of
the class action in mass tort cases, which entails the sending of no-
tices that are essentially invitations to sue, has likely brought in
some, and perhaps many, claims that would otherwise have been
141. In 1994, there were 57,940 prisoner petitions filed in all federal courts. 1994
ADMIN. OFFICE REPORT at A27. This constituted almost one-fourth of the civil filings,
up from 43,195 and less than 20% in 1990. 1& Less than 1% of these cases will result in
trial. Id. at A36-37. It must be assumed that the number of prisoner petitions filed in
federal court will very soon reach six figures.
142. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere! The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENY. U. L. REV. 77 (1993) [hereinafter Debased Debate]; Marc Galanter, The Life and
Times of the Big Si; or The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L.
REv. 921, 923 (1988); Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 396-407; see also TERENCE
DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS vii (1990) (arguing that the growth of civil litigation will not
greatly lengthen the aggregate time to disposition in federal courts).
143. LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL CoUnTs, supra note 57, at 9-13.
144. The term seems to have been invented by Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our Na-
tional Disease, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977).
145. For an account of the many sources of the caseload increase, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93 (1985); Wolf Heydebrand &
Carroll Seron, The Rising Demand for Court Services: A Structural Explanation of the
Caseload of United States District Courts, 11 JUST. SYS. J 303, 313-20 (1986).
146. Thomas B. Marvell, Civil Caseloads: The Impact of the Economy and Trial Judge-
ship Increases, 69 JUDICATURE 153, 153-54 (1985).
147. Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 499-500 (1991). See also Roberta Romano, The
Shareholder Suit Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 55, 55-56 (1991).
If this were a problem, it may have been corrected by the 1995 amendments to the
Securities Act.
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forsaken by the claimants. It is also possible that there has been
some marginal decline in the moral constraints on the assertion of
false claims. Senator Biden did not speak to this alleged problem
of hyperlexis, but it was in the minds of many who have been
leading critics of the legal system.
However, the complaint about hyperlexis, like the complaints
regarding cost and delay, is seldom accompanied by empirical
data."4 Anecdotal evidence of the alleged hyperlexis was, of
course, not hard to come by; frivolous or hopeless claims abound
now as before and cannot be rare in any legal system, as are
hopeless defenses erected to gain for defendants the benefits of
the law's delay. As early as 1815, Americans were accusing one
another of being too contentious. One observer of that time ex-
plained:
The noble definition of law, that nothing is so high as to be
above its reach or so low as to be beyond its care, is probably
true to a greater practical extent in this country than in any
other. The cause obviously is, not our liberty alone, but an alli-
ance between an active and restless spirit of freedom and the
comfortable condition of all classes of the community, not ex-
cepting, relatively considered, even the poor. This encourages and
provokes the disposition to go to law by supplying it almost
universally with the means. We have honest blacksmiths suing
banks for false imprisonment, and street cleaners suing fine gen-
tlemen for assaults and batteries as the common occurrences of
our courts.
1 4 9
All thinags considered, the chorus of complaint about civil proce-
dure coming from "habitual defendants" appears to have been
largely an expression of self-interest on the part of those who
were losing lawsuits that they would have preferred to win. While
there is no occasion for complacency in addressing such problems
as the misuse of discovery and the profligate use of opinion testi-
mony, neither was there cause for general alarm. It appears that
Senator Biden was beguiled by a campaign of disinformation.50
148. See generally Richard D. Catenacci, Hyperlexis or Hyperbole: Subdividing the
Landscape of Disputes and Defusing the Litigation Explosion, 8 REV. LmTIG. 297 (1989)
(reviewing the literature of excessive litigiousness).
149. RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1815), reprinted in THE LEGAL
MIND IN AMERICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 44 (Perry Miller ed.,
1962).
150. There is, however, little reason to believe that CJRA has in fact benefited any
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One explanation of the initiative leading to his 1990 Act and
the haste with which it was enacted is that it was a competitive re-
sponse.' Senator Biden may have been competing with Vice
President Quayle's Competitiveness Council which advanced many
similar diagnoses and prescriptions. 52 The Quayle group did no
more to identify the problem it sought to solve than did the Judi-
ciary Committee. Nor was it any better equipped to identify those
grievants who were so dissatisfied with the quality of civil justice
in the federal courts. Nor did it have solutions likely to effect
general reductions in the cost of civil litigation or in the time
elapsing between filings and judgments. It did address the problem
of profligacy in the use of opinion evidence, 53 but these recom-
mendations have not found their way into legislative proposals. If
it was possible to be more indifferent to empirically demonstrable
reality than the Senate Judiciary Committee, Vice President
Quayle achieved that feat with his famous broadside attack on
trial lawyers." What may have been behind both initiatives, as
well as some of the propaganda about the deficiencies of civil
justice in the federal courts, were the dissatisfactions of tort defen-
dants, particularly defendants in products liability cases who were
and are exposed by state tort law to risks of seemingly gigantic
and arguably excessive liabilities,55 liabilities to which some for-
corporate defendants who might have stimulated the Senator's interest. See D. Jeffrey
Campbell & Jonathan R. Kuhlman, Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: An Experiment
Gone Awry, 60 DEF. CoUNS. J. 17 (1993)
151. See Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST. .
ON DIsP. RESOL 115, 115-16, 129-30 (1991) (arguing that the regulation was a response
to an alleged crisis in the federal court system); Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at
385-92.
152. See COUNCIL ON COMPEITIVENESS WORKING GROUP ON CIVIL JUSTICE RE-
FORM, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991) [hereinafter RECOM-
MENDATION]. Its recommendations were embodied in S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992). See also Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. §
519 (1994); Dan Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992) (discussing
proposals for reforming civil justice system). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Re-
form Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507 (1992) (charting developments in civil justice reform);
Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521 (1993)
(discussing origin and development of civil justice reform).
153. RECOMMENDATION, supra note 152, at 12-14.
154. 1991 American Bar Association Annual Meeting (Aug. 11, 1991) (transcript avail-
able from Federal News Service).
155. Deborah R. Hensler concludes that the Council's proposals went well beyond
procedural reform: "These proposals seek to change the current balance between indi-
vidual plaintiffs and corporate defendants, in favor of the latter. That agenda is a politi-
cal one, and it ought to be debated and decided on the floors of Congress and state
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eign competitors may not be exposed. This is the substance, if any
exists, behind the smoke about hyperlexis, cost, delay, and compet-
itiveness.5 6 But few, if any, politicians were ready to discuss tort
reform in 1990 or 1992, and so the less threatening subject of civil
procedure served as a surrogate.5 7 As Marc Galanter has amply
demonstrated, the debate on civil justice reform was accordingly
riddled with empirically falsifiable assumptions and assertions.' 58
Senator Biden began his efforts to confront the evils of cost
and delay by securing the help of the Brookings Institution
(Brookings). At his request, it examined the evils anew, largely
disregarding the studies cited here. It appears that the funds for
the study came from a foundation run by a member of the
Senator's staff;159 the source of its funds is unknown. A study
group appointed by Brookings, from which sitting federal judges
were excluded and in which representatives of business were min-
gled with a few representatives of other factions,16° met six times,
with the Senator's staff serving as the staff of the study group to
set its agenda. A Harris poll was conducted for the group; the
poll, of course, could not measure cost or delay, but measured the
impressions of cost and delay of some lawyers and judges. 6' The
Senator's staff then wrote a report, relying on the authority of the
Harris poll as evidence of a problem to be remedied and disre-
garding the much harder data gathered by the Federal Judicial
Center and other social scientists." The Brookings study group
legislatures." Deborah R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Coun-
cil on Competitiveness's Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 250 (1992).
156. Patrick Atiyah estimated that the total cost of tort claims in the United States is
roughly 10 times that in the United Kingdom. Patrick S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alter-
natives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1009-12.
157. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revi-
sion, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827 (1993) (arguing that changes in substantive law have been
camouflaged as procedural reforms); Carl Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857 (1993) (noting the argument that political factors affect-
ed the enactment of reform).
158. Debased Debate, supra note 142; see also Robel, supra note 151, at 117 (discuss-
ing underlying assumptions in the debate).
159. Mark Gitenstein was the Senator's staff director and President of the Foundation
for Change, Inc. The Brookings study may have been the only activity of the Founda-
tion.
160. Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 389 n.42.
161. Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES, INC., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM: A STUDY CONDUCTED FOR THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (1989).
162. BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 6-7 (1989).
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did not again meet to discuss this report, but it was nevertheless
published as a Brookings document. The Senator's staff then draft-
ed a bill embodying ideas set forth in the report they had them-
selves written. The Judicial Conference of the United States was
never consulted by the Brookings group or by the Senate staff,
nor were any of the many organizations that routinely review the
work of the Judicial Conference, such as the American Bar Asso-
ciation, the American College of Trial Lawyers, or even the De-
partment of Justice. The Brookings report was little more than
smoke to screen the source of the Senator's initiative.163
A serious deficiency evident in both the Brookings report and
the Senator's bill was the lack of a new solution to any problem
they proposed to confront. As Patrick Johnson has observed, the
bill did not reveal its objective with sufficient clarity to allow us to
know when it might have been achieved; it was not clear, for
example, how much delay should be reduced.1" Presumably, cas-
es are not to be tried on the day they are filed, and presumably
some cases will be ready sooner than others, but neither the re-
port or the bill gave counsel about how soon is soon enough and
not too soon.
The draft bill nevertheless proposed a system of "tracking"
that aimed to assure firm, early trial dates in most cases. Experi-
ence seems to confirm that a fixed early trial date tends to pre-
vent the metastisization of pretrial litigation and thus reduces cost;
many federal judges were striving to fix early trial dates for that
reason. Others, especially those afflicted with heavy criminal dock-
ets, seemed to experience less success in holding to a schedule.
The duty of federal courts to give preference to criminal cases
ready for trial reflects the right of accused persons to a speedy
trial, a right reconfirmed in Section 3162(a)(2) of the Criminal
Code." When a civil trial is rescheduled to accommodate the
criminal docket, the savings associated with firm scheduling is lost,
and additional expense is often incurred.
163. Charles A. Wright generously describes the report as "particularly influential."
CHARLES A. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 436 (5th ed. 1994). However, its influ-
ence was preordained; causation went from the Senate to Brookings, not from Brookings
to the Senate.
164. Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and Perfection,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 833, 849-55 (1994).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1994).
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The draft also proposed requiring case management as a
means of controlling discovery abuse. A growing number of feder-
al judges were making increasing use of case management tech-
niques entailing regular contact between the court and counsel as
they prepared cases for settlement or trial. While individual judges
have achieved some remarkable feats by means of case manage-
ment, it is not certain that case management, as practiced by many
judges, is truly an effective economy.'" It can absorb judicial en-
ergy and make work for lawyers, especially when it does not func-
tion smoothly, as happens in some cases, and more frequently with
some judges.' 67
An odd feature of the Brookings-Biden initiative was its fail-
ure to take notice of the fact that the problems of civil justice
were adversely affected by the huge increase in criminal litigation
visited upon the federal courts in the decade previous to the en-
actment of the CJRA. It was also odd that an act entitled "Civil
Justice" reflected concern for no aspect of justice other than its
price and its timeliness;'" it seemed to assume that whatever was
being done in the federal courts should and could be continued,
but done faster and cheaper. It thus appears that Senator Biden
and his Brookings supporters were among those losing interest in
the accuracy of the judgments rendered in federal courts.
The Judicial Conference protested; indeed, there was a chorus
of objection from federal judges, although there were a few judi-
cial supporters of the bill, including the judges of the District of
New Jersey,'69 who were rewarded for their support with three
new judgeships.7 In addition to pointing to the deficiencies in
the Act, some judges also gently objected that the proposal was an
intrusion on the independence of the federal judiciary.'7' The
166. For example, the effectiveness of court-annexed ADR remains in substantial
doubt. Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of
Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169 (1993); Dayton,
supra note 64, at 928.
167. See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1995 (using the example of judicially ordered early
scheduling discussions with litigants).
168. William H. Erickson, Limited Discovery and the Use of Alternative Procedures for
Dispute Resolution, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 303 (1994).
169. H.R. Rep. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 79 (1990) (Letter of Chief Judge
John F. Gerry).
170. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, tit. II, 104 Stat. 5098, 5100 (1990).
171. See, ag., The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 & the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990: Hearings on S. 2027 & S. 2648 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
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judges were supported in this contention, albeit without vigor, by
the American Bar Association and the Department of Justice.
When his bill met with so little approval from the knowledgeable
persons most involved, Senator Biden redrafted his Act to strike
the objectionable provisions mandating his system to assure early
trial dates, and then secured its enactment. As enacted, CJRA in
effect told the district judges to go back and work out local solu-
tions to the problems that his draft bill had tried to address. The
Act requires each district to appoint an advisory committee to
study its docket and the causes of cost and delay, and to produce
a plan to reduce those evils. The plans are authorized to include a
menu of suggested case management techniques,"7 virtually all of
which were already in common usage in many districts, including
measures to facilitate settlement.173 An advance guard of ten ex-
perimental districts was created. And the Act provided that the
sun would set on the experiments with a report to Congress at the
end of 1995,"4 suggesting the possibility that the sun will set on
local plans as well.
Insofar as CJRA encourages experimentation, it is congruent
with a long-held ambition of many judges and scholars to employ
scientific methods to ascertain what works in procedure. 75 Alas,
there is very little science to be employed in these experiments.
The experiments are uncontrolled; there is no scientific method
employed in planning them; there are ninety-four experiments
proceeding at once; and the experiments were to be completed
Cong., 2d Sess. 310, 333-44 (1990) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2027] (statement of Hon.
Robert F. Peckham made on behalf of the Judicial Conference of the United States).
172. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1994).
173. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b).
174. See §§ 105(b)(3) and (c).
175. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Foreword: The Scientific Study of Legal Institutions,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1; A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experi-
ments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1581-82, 1590-95
(1991); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67; Laurens Walker, A Com-
prehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 484-89
(1993). Louis Brandeis opposed enactment of the Rules Enabling Act and dissented from
promulgation of the 1938 rules, apparently because he favored experimentation; but the
experimentation he favored envisioned differences among the 50 states, with political
accountability in each state. It is safe to assume that Brandeis would have opposed ex-
perimentation among 94 groups of federal judges who are accountable to no one. His
views are discussed in Paul Freund, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUsTIcE 177, 189-92,
(Allison Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1964).
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within three years, long before secondary or tertiary effects can be
experienced and measured. In this respect, the Act is further con-
firmation of the disjunction between the politics of court reform
and the realities of what happens in court.176
Not a word was uttered to explain the relation between the
1990 Act and the 1988 Act. Inasmuch as there was little new in
the menu of management techniques each plan is authorized to
include, it is possible that the 1990 Act was seen to create no
significant conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Yet
there was obvious tension between the encouragement of local
planning in 1990 and the suppression of local rulemaking in 1988.
The clutter that Congress wanted to reduce in 1988 seemed to be
the desired result in 1990. No effort was made to reconcile these
conflicting signals.
The Act obliged each district court to consult with its "users,"
organized as the local advisory committee appointed to study its
docket and recommend a plan.'" Such local advisory committees
had been established as early as 1982.178 It was suggested that
these consultations would make the local plans more responsive to
local problems and concerns, providing an element of democratic
self-government in local rulemaking. 79 But unlike a town or
county or school district, a judicial district is a governmental unit
without a political constituency. No one is commissioned to speak
for the people of a judicial district because no one is in any way
accountable directly or indirectly to the people whose lives are
governed and whose rights are valued or devalued by the action
or inaction of the local court. While rulemaking at the national
level has with justification been described as undemocratic, 80 lo-
cal committees are no more democratic, and may well be less
responsive to public concerns and to the public interest, than are
the committees of the Judicial Conference.'
176. See, e.g., Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice and Court
Reform: Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319 (1985) (criticizing
court reformers' reaction to an alleged litigation explosion).
177. 28 U.S.C. §§ 472, 478 (1994).
178. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1994).
179. S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6817-19; Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United,": The Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 105, 109-10 (1991).
180. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 116, at 6-8; Hazard, supra note 52, at 1286-87 (re-
viewing WEINSTEIN, supra); Howard Lesnick, The Federal Rule-Making Process: A Time
for Re-Examination, 61 A.B.A. J. 579, 579-80 (1975).
181. The Senate Committee Report quoted me as one favoring greater openness and
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My own experience with diverse committees composed of
lawyers and judges is that the lawyers are conscientious, but tend
to be co-opted by judges. That seems to have been the dynamic of
most local advisory committees. However, when this does not
happen, there is, as Lauren Robel' and Linda Mullenix183
have observed, a greater hazard than co-optation."s If advisory
groups are dominated by lawyers who continue to represent their
clients, local plans will be the product of efforts to secure not civil
justice but any available advantages over their clients' adversaries
that can be secured by rule of court. Especially advantaged in such
a process will be litigants and lawyers who appear repeatedly in a
particular district and thus have sufficient stakes in shaping court
rules to protect their interests to make the effort worth their
while."s Indeed, if a truly representative group of litigants were
to try to fashion a system of civil procedure for their own use,
they would likely be unable to agree on any system and might
conclude by calling for disinterested persons to fashion a system
for them. One large advantage of the national rulemaking process
created in 1934, seen as a disadvantage chiefly by those who ex-
pect to be disfavored by rules fashioned by disinterested persons,
is that a committee of the Judicial Conference is virtually invulner-
able to the influence of self-aggrandizing factional politics. Judicial
committees are not without prejudices, but they are almost without
interests, and that is an important qualification possessed by no
local advisory committee.
One consequence of the creation of local committees to study
dockets was to give added publicity to the shortfalls in productivity
of some district judges. The fear of public embarrassment seems to
democracy in rulemaking. S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6815-16. I did support the changes made for that purpose by
the 1988 Act, but nothing I said in 1988 was fairly applicable to the form of participato-
ry democracy embodied in the 1990 Act.
182. Lauren Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 879, 902-03 (1993).
183. Counter-Reformation, supra note 12, at 406-07 (1992).
184. See also Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the
1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can Systemic Ills Afflicting the
Federal Courts Be Remedied by Local Rules?, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 721, 734-55 (1993)
(offering general criticism of local rulemaking).
185. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim-
its of Legal Change, 9 LAw & SOc'Y REV. 95, 123-24 (1974).
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have prodded a few to do more judicial work. Early returns sug-
gest that this may be the one positive effect of the Act."8
Making law for other people to obey is fun, and most lawyers
suppose they can do it better than the next person. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, some district courts leapt at CJRA's invitation to exer-
cise a measure of legislative autonomy."8 None was more forth-
coming than the Eastern District of Texas, and so its Plan raises
the following six questions to be addressed in this Article:
(1) Does Congress have the constitutional power to authorize
lower federal courts to disregard procedures mandated by the
Supreme Court?
(2) If so, was that power exercised in 1990 in silent repudiation
of the provisions of its unrepealed 1988 Act?
(3) Can Congress constitutionally delegate to Article III courts
authority to enact fee-shifting laws?
(4) If so, did Congress grant them that authority in 1990, or has
it by its unrepealed Fees Act of 1853 forbidden such judicial leg-
islation?
(5) Can the federal government constitutionally enact law impos-
ing a fee-shifting offer of settlement rule on parties asserting
claims or defenses arising under state law, solely on the basis of
federal judicial jurisdiction over litigation in which the claims or
defenses are asserted?
(6) If so, has Congress effectively authorized federal district
courts to decide whether such a rule should be imposed on such
cases, or has it by the Rules of Decision Act of 1789 forbidden
such federal intrusions on state law?
186. R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act:
Look Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 687, 706-08 (1993); Charles G. Geyh, Ad-
verse Publicity as a Means of Reducing Judicial Decision-Making Delay: Periodic Disclo-
sure of Pending Motions, Bench Trials and Cases Under the Civil Justice Reform Act, 41
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 511, 532-36 (1993).
187. Accounts of local plans include: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES,
CiviL JusTIcE REFORM Acr REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS
BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTmmRs AND PILOT CouRTs (1992); Mary Brigid
McManarnon, Is the Recent Frenzy of Civil Justice Reform a Cure-All or a Placebo? An
Examination of the Plans of Two Pilot Districts, 11 REv. LMG. 329 (1992); Linda S.
Mullenix, Civil Justice Reform Comes to the Southern District of Texas: Creating and Im-
plementing A Cost and Reduction Plan Under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 11
REv. LrrG. 165 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 89 (1993).
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If the answer to any one of these six questions is negative, the
Eastern Texas Plan is invalid. I contend, albeit with uneven confi-
dence, that the correct answers to all six are negative.
IV. LIMITS TO THE POWER OF CONGRESS OVER THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
The limits, if any, to the constitutional power of Congress
over the conduct of federal courts have been mooted since the
time of the first Judiciary Act."s Academic and professional lit-
erature is replete with flat, unsupported statements of commenta-
tors-some declaring the absolute power of Congress over the
judicial institutions it creates, others asserting broad limitations on
legislative power. There is little need here for a full review of that
literature. Senator Biden stands at one end of a spectrum of opin-
ion;... John Henry Wigmore at the other.
The applicable constitutional text is familiar and simple: "The
judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."'"9 And "[t]he Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continu-
ance in Office."'' This text thus suggests two limitations on the
power of Congress that are applicable to CJRA. While Congress
has no duty to provide for federal trial courts, and, according to
convention, can limit federal jurisdiction as it chooses,' 92 and
write laws that confine judicial discretion within a very narrow
188. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73.
189. S. REP. No. 416, supra note 179, at 8, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6811.
See also Peck, supra note 179, at 114.
190. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
191. Id.
192. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869); Robert N. Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early Implementation of and Departures
from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1593-1616 (1986); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1362-63 (1953). But McCardle was an exceptional case
that may mean less than it appears. For careful analysis, see William W. Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 229 (1973); Proceedings of the
Forty-Third Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 96 F.R.D.
245, 277-79 (May 9-12, 1982) (Remarks by Professor William W. Van Alstyne, Duke
University School of Law).
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range, 9 3 any courts the Congress creates must be inferior to the
Supreme Court and must enjoy independence from control by the
political branches sufficient to their mission. The latter requires
that they be free to perform the core judicial function of applying
law to fact in those cases and controversies brought before them
without obstruction by the politically accountable branches of
government. 4
The utterances of the Supreme Court regarding the power of
Congress over federal procedure have generally been tangential to
a discussion of more immediate issues. The Court first addressed
separation of powers with respect to civil procedure in 1812; it
then upheld an exercise of the contempt power by a federal trial
court, but construed the power narrowly and called on Congress to
provide broader authority if it concluded that the courts it had
created needed additional power. 5 In 1873, the Court reaf-
firmed that the contempt power is "essential to the administration
of justice" and implied that the power cannot be withdrawn by
Congress.' 96 In a 1911 case arising out of a labor injunction, the
Court described the contempt power as an "integral part of the
independence of the judiciary."'197 In 1924, the Court upheld leg-
islation providing for jury trials in contempt proceedings arising
out of decrees enforcing the Clayton Act,' but again affirmed
that while Congress might regulate the contempt power, it could
not withdraw that power because it is inherent in the constitution-
al duty to decide cases. In 1987, the Court explained Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 42(b) as an expression of a federal court's
inherent authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute con-
tempt "without complete dependence on other Branches" of the
government.'99 These cases are not conclusive of the issue at
hand.
193. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding act that limit-
ed judicial discretion regarding sentencing).
194. See Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence. Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REv. 697, 701-23 (1995).
195. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
196. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873).
197. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911).
198. Michaelson v. United States ex reL Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry.,
266 U.S. 42, 71 (1924).
199. Young v. United States ex reL Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987).
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Similarly, the Court has spoken of the trial court's power to
regulate the conduct of lawyers as one that is inherent and not
dependent on any authority conferred on the courts by Congress.
Its first utterance on this subject came in 18 24 ."o More recently,
the Court has upheld the "inherent" powers of a district court to
dismiss a case for failure to prosecute,20' to exclude a lawyer
from practice before the court,' and to impose sanctions on a
party for litigating in bad faith. 3 The relation between "inherent
power" of the judiciary and powers that may not be withdrawn by
Congress has never been illuminated by the Court for there has
been no occasion to consider it.2° The most recent expression by
the Court on the "inherent power" of federal courts, Chambers v.
Nasco,20 5 insists on the prerogative of the courts, with or without
legislative authorization, to punish parties who obstruct their pro-
ceedings or defile "the very temple of justice."2°6 These cases,
like those bearing on the contempt power, are inconclusive.
Indeed, at the same time that the Court has asserted the
inherent powers of the Article III judiciary, it has in dictum re-
peatedly reaffirmed the power of Congress to enact legislation
bearing on the conduct of the courts. Chief Justice Marshall did so
as early as 1825.2w In interpreting the rules of court it has pro-
mulgated pursuant to the 1934 Rules Enabling Act, the Court has
consistently referred for their source to its delegated power rather
than to its inherent power. Senator Biden found it useful, in as-
serting his claim to absolute legislative power over the federal
courts, to quote sentences from the Court's opinions in Sibbach v.
Wilson" and Hanna v. Plumer.2 9 But the acknowledgments of
200. Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530-31 (1824).
201. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962).
202. In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985).
203. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
204. But see Eash v. Riggins Trucking, 757 F.2d. 557, 562-63 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(noting constitutional issues with respect to defining "inherent power"). The Third Circuit
there distinguished three kinds of "inherent power," the first of which was beyond the
reach of Congress to confine. Id at 562. The Supreme Court noted the discussion, but
did not ratify it in Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49 n.12.
205. 501 U.S. 32, 51-55 (1991).
206. Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
207. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825); see also Livingston v.
Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 655-56 (1835).
208. 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
209. 380 U.S. 460, 473 (1965). Surprisingly to me, Professor Redish seems to endorse
the Senator's misuse of these dicta. Redish, supra note 194, at 725.
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the authority of Congress are found in passages in which the
Court is addressing considerations of federalism, not those of sepa-
ration of powers. In both cases cited by the Senator, the Court
was affirming the power of the federal government to conduct its
courts in a manner agreeable to Congress rather than according to
dictates of state legislatures. The two problems are easily
conflated. We will return to the federalism issue below because it
is also implicated by the Eastern Texas Plan.
Juxtaposed to the position of Senator Biden is that of Wig-
more, perhaps the most distinguished American academic lawyer
of the 20th century. Wigmore contended that procedural rule-
making is a judicial preserve Congress is powerless to invade.2 0
Wigmore's position had been embraced in some state constitution-
al conventions making explicit the limitation on legislative power
over courts,21 ' and would be adopted in other future conven-
tions.21 2 Roscoe Pound challenged the breadth of the Wigmore
argument as it applied to federal courts, pointing out that the
Supreme Court of the United States had acquiesced in legislative
enactments that violated his principle 1 3 Pound, however, re-
newed the idea in support of the efforts of Chief Justice Arthur
Vanderbilt to overhaul civil procedure in New Jersey.1 4
Pound's point about acquiescence is sound; the Supreme
Court of the United States has indeed long acquiesced in legisla-
210. John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judicial Procedure Are Void Constitu-
tionally, 23 U. ILL L. REV. 276 (1928).
211. E.g., WYo. CONST. art. V, § 2 (1890). For a recent application invalidating legis-
lation regulating pleading in that state's courts, see White v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 106-07
(Wyo. 1982).
212. E.g., NJ. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3 (1948); see also A. Leo Levin & Anthony
G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitution-
al Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33 (1958) (noting that "[t]he Puerto Rico Constitu-
tion, the proposed Illinois Judicial Amendment, and perhaps the Alaskan Constitution
grant to their respective highest courts a similar authority [to that of New Jersey]: power
without review in the area of 'administration' "). Most state constitutions conferring exclu-
sive rulemaking power on their highest courts also provide for some form of election of
judges. The political accountability of a court may bear on the suitability of locating
broad rulemaking power in it.
213. Roscoe Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 601
(1926); accord Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A
Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MiCH. L. REV. 623, 642 (1957).
214. See Winberry v. Salisbury, 74 A.2d 406 (NJ. 1950) (Vanderbilt, CJ.); Benjamin
Kaplan & Warren J. Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Ap-
praisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REv. 234 (1951); Roscoe Pound, Procedure
Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REv. 28, 28-29 (1952).
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tion regarding the management of the district courts. Moreover,
the federal judiciary has often sought congressional action, general-
ly welcoming the imprimatur of Congress to enhance the legitima-
cy of procedural arrangements potentially affecting substantive
rights of citizens. But there has also been acquiescence by Con-
gress, for it has seldom, if ever, presumed to enact legislation
bearing on the routine of the federal courts; and on matters affect-
ing the courts, Congress has seldom proceeded without consulting
the judges. Much of the legislation presently embodied in Title 28
is the product of a joint lawmaking venture in which representa-
tive federal judges had a significant hand.215 At times, the De-
partment of Justice has played a role of monitoring cooperation
between Congress and the courts.216 There has therefore never to
this point been a serious conflict between the inherent power of
independent courts and the power of Congress to regulate proce-
dure in the courts it creates. Indeed, there is no instance in the
history of federal legislation bearing on courts when Congress has
interposed its power to diminish the authority of the Supreme
Court over inferior federal courts.
One reason for traditional congressional acquiescence with
respect to the internal affairs of the judiciary may be historical;
English royal courts sitting in America generally fashioned their
own procedure without legislative involvement, and hence, when
the Constitution spoke of the "Judicial Power" in Article III, that
power may well have been thought to include the power to fash-
ion rules of procedure.217 But there are other practical reasons
why Congress has not limited the contempt power or denied dis-
trict courts power to regulate the conduct of lawyers, prescribed
rules of pleading and practice, or limited the authority of the
Supreme Court to direct the affairs of lower courts. One is that
Congress has wanted, and continues to want, strong courts that
can enforce the laws that it makes, and thus Congress has general-
215. Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, A Judicious Legislator's Lexi-
con to the Federal Judiciary, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOwARD INSTITUTIONAL CO-
MrrY 54, 70-71 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988).
216. PETER G. FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 91-165
(1973) (considering the role of the Department of Justice in the first half of this centu-
ry).
217. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Con-
stitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1466 n.217 (1984).
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ly lent its authority to the pursuit of that end, at least since the
first term of the presidency of Thomas Jefferson. 18 The dialogue
between Congress and the Court on these matters can therefore
be viewed as a pas de deux in which the Court's role is always to
defer to Congress as the stronger partner, but also always to play
the more creative and subtle role. Or it might be likened to the
traditional family in which the husband, like Congress, is designat-
ed as the head of the household, but finds it imprudent ever to
test the limits of any prerogatives that might be associated with
that elevated status. In such relationships, an utterance or a ges-
ture here or there cannot be taken as an important indication of
what is really going on. Thus, the Court has never found it neces-
sary to bring its utterances about the power of Congress over the
federal courts together with its utterances about inherent judicial
power.
There is constitutional artistry to this pas de deux. The institu-
tions of Article III are blatantly undemocratic. That quality was
built into Article III and has since been perceived to be essential
to the role of courts in the government of our constitutional re-
public. Their relative freedom from factional politics is at once the
source of their strength and of their limitations. The Constitution
provides, the republic needs, and the people want the balancing
dose of undemocratic elitism that the federal courts bring to gov-
ernment. Because the independence of the federal judiciary is now
generally accepted and approved by the American people, few
factional politicians in Congress will dare assail it. Yet very few of
us are ready to be governed by judges, especially those with life-
time appointments. A federal judiciary that overplays its hand is
met with public indignation and defiance. Hence the dance of
shared authority, and hence a happy indeterminacy in our law: We
do not know whether there is a fixed limit to the power of Con-
gress over the federal courts, and we ought hope never to find
out.
Other academic commentators have embraced Wigmore's
position regarding the constitutional power of courts to make
rules,219 while some have explicitly rejected it. 0 Mullenix is its
218. RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS 233-50 (1971) (describing forma-
tion of the judiciary under the Jefferson administration).
219. See, eg., Joiner & Miller, supra note 213, at 628-30 (When the purpose of a rule
is efficient judicial administration, "the scope of the inherent power vested in the courts
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most recent champion, and she would apply it to invalidate the
Civil Justice Reform Act. 1 To consider the Wigmore-Mullenix
position, it is useful to imagine legislation that Congress has never
enacted and is unlikely ever to enact. For example, suppose that
Congress undertook to regulate the hours of holding court, amend-
ing Section 139 of Title 28 to provide that every district judge
shall be on the bench from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. five days a week, fifty
weeks a year, national holidays excluded.m A comparable mea-
sure would require executive officers of cabinet rank to keep such
office hours. Congress creates departments of the executive branch
and can abolish them, just as it can abolish lower federal courts;
however, having created them, it cannot micromanage them with-
out taking leave of its constitutional role. Likewise, Congress can-
not create politically servile institutions and call them courts of the
United States. We can be sure that neither the judiciary nor the
President's cabinet would ever punch Congress's clock if Congress
were ever of a mind to establish one. To take other far-fetched
examples, the Supreme Court ought not and would not submit if
Congress directed that the number of secretaries and law clerks
assigned to individual judges shall vary according to a legislated
formula linking support staff to the number of dispositions each
judge achieves. Nor if it required the Chief Justice of the United
States each year to assign the least productive (however defined)
district judges to night court duties; perhaps Congress might per-
missibly confer such powers on the Chief Justice as the highest
officer of the third branch, but it could not constitutionally require
that the Chief exercise them. Of course, these examples are ludi-
crous, but the fact that they are so confirms that there is a core of
is complete and supreme.").
220. See, e.g., Michael M. Martin, Inherent Judicial Power: Flexibility Congress Did Not
Write into the Federal Rules of Evidence, 57 TEX. L. REv. 167, 176-79 (1979) (finding
that Wigmore's position is "no longer credible").
221. Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separation of Powers, 77 MiNN. L. REv. 1283, 1338 (1993) ("If the Civil Justice Reform
[Act] is not declared unconstitutional, there will be no end to the continuing politicization
of the judicial branch."). For a response to Mullenix, see Redish, supra note 194, at
725-30. Mullenix replied in Linda S. Mullenix, Judicial Power and the Rules Enabling
Act, 46 MERCER L. REv. 733 (1995).
222. Section 139 presently provides as follows: "The times for commencing regular
sessions of the district court for transacting judicial business at the places fixed by this
chapter shall be determined by the rules or orders of the court." 28 U.S.C. § 139 (1994).
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control vested in the Supreme Court that is beyond the constitu-
tional reach of Congress.
A likely aspect of that core is the Court's authority over infe-
rior courts. Congress has never attempted to diminish that authori-
ty and is not likely to do so. But if Congress did so forget itself, it
is unlikely that the Court would submit, nor should it. Congress
could not authorize each district court to become a law unto itself
with respect to matters that are procedural.
Congress has acknowledged the special standing of the Su-
preme Court as an institution having responsibilities not wholly
subject to legislative dominion. That acknowledgment was ex-
pressed in the supersession clause included in the provisions of the
1934 Act, which gives overriding effect to procedural rules that
clash with pre-existing acts of Congress. ' Pursuant to that provi-
sion, a valid rule of procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court
can override a prior statute, just as a valid statute can override a
prior rule of court. An example of its operation is provided by the
relation between Rule 54 of the 1938 rules and the Fees Act now
codified as Section 1920 of the Judicial Code. 4 The Fees Act as
it stood before 1938 provided that the costs listed in the Act
"shall" be taxed, leaving the district court no discretion in the
matter. In 1938, Rule 54(d) conferred discretionary power on the
court to withhold the taxation of costs, presumably to create an
additional incentive to the parties and counsel to conduct them-
selves in a suitable manner. The rule, if valid, superseded the stat-
ute. Whether it did or not, the change was unobjectionable to
Congress, for in 1948, it amended section 1920 to conform to the
rule by substituting "may" for "shall" in section 1920.m
Such a supersession clause is contained in no other federal
law authorizing an agency or board to exercise lawmaking respon-
sibility.' It is an act of Congress disavowing sole power over
procedure in federal courts. The one other use made of superses-
sion was in legislation enacted in the 1950s authorizing the execu-
tive branch of the federal government to reorganize itself to effect
economies in administration.m The supersession clause in the
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1994).
225. Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 955.
226. But cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1987) (holding unconstitutional a provision
for a one-house Congressional veto of administrative action).
227. See Act for the Establishment of a Commission on Organization of the Executive
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Rules Enabling Act was carefully reconsidered in 1988 and re-
tained; it was thought to serve the national interest because it
empowered the Court through its rulemaking subordinates to har-
monize national rules. It also enables the Court to retain a mea-
sure of control useful in maintaining the integrity of the process
employed by the lower federal courts. Its presence in the 1988 Act
reflects the judgment of Congress that the Supreme Court is no
ordinary delegate, but has a constitutional responsibility for proce-
dure in district courtsY-
This is not to say that the Rules Enabling Act is constitution-
ally required. Congress created the Judicial Conference of the
United States and could abolish it. It created the rulemaking pro-
cess and could abolish that. 9 Certainly it could repeal the su-
persession clause. But it cannot exclude the Supreme Court from
the authority and responsibility for giving direction to lower courts
that aim to ensure the fidelity of those lower courts to the central
judicial task of applying law to facts. If Congress abolished the
rulemaking infrastructure, the Court'would face three choices. One
option would be to fashion a federal procedure by means of
caselaw erected on the Constitution and whatever suitable statuto-
ry base Congress might have provided. To some extent, such
caselaw has materialized within the loose framework of the 1938
Rules 0 Such a resort to caselaw would result in a measure of
costly havoc, and in the short term would raise an issue whether
due process of law requires that there be some rules of the game
announced in advance of the commencement of play."1 A sec-
ond option would be to legislate a federal procedure without the
help of the Judicial Conference or any other subordinate body ap-
proved by Congress. The Court is poorly organized to perform this
function without help, but it is an imaginable response. The third
Branch of Government, Pub. L. No. 108-83, ch. 184, 67 Stat. 142 (1953). On the super-
session clause in this legislation, see RONALD C. MOE, THE HOOVER COMMISSIONS RE-
VISITED 84-90 (1982); BRADLEY D. NASH & CORNELIUS LYNDE, A HOOK IN LEVIA-
THAN 17-20 (1950).
228. See Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act,
1989 DUKE. LJ. 281, 322-26; see also Tyrrell Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules
of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U. L.Q. 459, 474 (1937).
229. This point is generally assumed. E.g., WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL
RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILrrlES 39 (1980).
230. E.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947).
231. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 568-71 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
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option, seemingly the most practical, would be to revert to the
policy of the Conformity Act and direct federal district courts to
adhere to local state practice "as near as may be." Balkanizing this
would be, but fifty states are fewer than ninety-four districts, and
the states have a political legitimacy that the district courts can
never attain.
I thus conclude that Congress lacks constitutional authority to
disable the Supreme Court from performing its constitutional re-
sponsibilities for the direction of "inferior" courts to ensure their
fidelity to law. If CJRA attempted to do that, it is unconstitutional
and the Court would be fully justified in asserting the superior
authority conferred upon it by Article III.
V. CJRA AS AN EXERCISE OF CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIY OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SUPREME COURT AND "INFERIOR COURTS"
Professor Mullenix's contention that the Civil Justice Reform
Act is invalid rests on her broad reading of the Act as an empow-
erment of district courts to do anything that strikes them as likely
to reduce cost or delay. She supposes that the Act purports to
disable the Supreme Court from performing its constitutional duty
to keep the district courts in line-to assure that we have one
legal system, not ninety-four. But Dean Robel contends that there
is no sufficient reason to read the CJRA as conferring so broad an
authority on district courts that these issues must be raised. 2
There have been other diverse readings of the 1990 Act. Ed-
ward Wesley was among the first to speak to the issue of the
authority the Act conferred on "inferior courts"; he thought it
authorized local departures from the national rules but only on the
narrow range of matters explicitly suggested in the Act. 3 Justice
Scalia, dissenting from the promulgation in 1993 of the new Rule
26, assumed that the Act authorized experimental deviation from
the Federal Rules, at least with respect to the regulation of discov-
ery; his position may be that of Wesley.' 4 Judge William
232. Robel, supra note 87.
233. His views are published. Edwin J. Wesley, The Civil Justice Reform Act; the
Rules Enabling Act; the Amended Rules of Civil Procedure; CJRA Plans; Rule 83-What
Trumps What?, in REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 456 (Hon. Marvin E. Aspen & Jerold S. Solovy eds.,
1994).
234. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 512 (1993)
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Schwarzer, the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, apparently
made the Mullenix assumption; without attending to the problems
of statutory and constitutional interpretation, he suggested experi-
ments with fee-shifting offer-of-settlement rules.235
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee recommended the 1993
revisions of the discovery rules on the assumption that Robel's
reading is probably correct. It gave sustained attention to the issue
of potential conflict between the Rules and local plans. Prior to
1988, there had been many local rules limiting the number of
interrogatories, and some local rules limiting the number or length
of depositions. Whether or not these were "not inconsistent" with
the discovery rules before 1988, they were almost surely invalid
after the amendment of the Rules Enabling Act limiting local
rulemaking, and the Committee was therefore compelled to consid-
er whether limitations on discovery should be included in the
national Rules. In 1989, it was considering and proposing rules
amendments designed to bring the national rules into line with
useful local rules that may have been rendered invalid by the 1988
Act. It was then noticed that some districts were requiring an
early meeting of counsel to exchange disclosures of obviously
discoverable material as a predicate to a meeting with the court to
fix limits on the amount of discovery suited to their particular
case. After the Committee published for public comment a draft
incorporating this idea, it became apparent that its draft was being
included in many local plans promulgated under CJRA. This be-
came a matter of immediate concern to the Committee when it
concluded that its draft was not in satisfactory form to be adopted
as a national rule. Although not yet fully convinced that disclo-
sures and standard limits on discovery are a good idea, and dis-
inclined to favor local options with respect to such matters, the
Committee concluded that it was the better part of valor to ac-
commodate the local planning process by authorizing such "experi-
mental" departures from the national rules. Its purpose was thus
to facilitate some of the local planning being done pursuant to
CJRA. Numerous persons who opposed the disclosure require-
ments did so on the ground that the Committee should not im-
pede local experiments with similar provisions contained in plans
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
235. See William W. Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to
Reducing the Cost of Litigation, 76 JuDICATURE 147 (1992).
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promulgated under CIRA and should await the outcome of those
experiments. Persons making this argument at the Committee's
hearings were asked to point to text in CJRA supporting their
assumption that such provisions in local plans were valid; none did
so. The same persons were also asked to reconcile their assump-
tion regarding CJRA with the 1988 legislation that the Committee
was also obliged to recognize and enforce. None ventured to do
that, either. Accordingly, the Civil Rules Committee, comprised
largely of federal judges, acted on the belief that unless it autho-
rized such experiments by amending Rule 26, some and perhaps
many of the provisions set forth in proposed local plans to regu-
late discovery would be invalid. 6 The same view was accepted
without challenge in the Standing Committee on Rules of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, which reviewed the proposal
with care, and passed it along to the Judicial Conference and the
Supreme Court for action. Clearly, the rulemakers are not the
appropriate authority to have the last word in a conflict between
their rules and local plans, but it is pertinent that numerous feder-
al judges, most of them district judges, supposed that a local plan
promulgated under CJRA was not authorized to override a nation-
al rule, much less other provisions of unrepealed legislation.
Robel and the Committee were correct. Bold statements in
the legislative history about the absolute power of Congress to
regulate the courts it creates' are scarcely a sufficient basis to
hold that the Congress in 1990 actually exercised any power it
might or might not possess to authorize district courts to defy not
only the Supreme Court but also Congress's own utterances of
1988. The 1990 Act should be read, as Robel and the Committee
read it, against the background of unrepealed provisions of the
Judicial Code and, if possible, to avoid constitutional issues. 38
In examining the text of CJRA in search of an explicit provi-
sion authorizing local defiance, one finds instead provisions requir-
ing that local plans be subject to the scrutiny of higher authority
236. Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real
Friends, 156 F.R.D. 295, 304-06 (1994); cf. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of
the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L. REV. 9, 20-21 (1994) (identifying problems of "na-
tionwide uniformity" and "case uniformity").
237. E.g., Hearings on S. 2027, supra note 171 (statement of Sen. Joseph R Biden,
Jr.).
238. The authoritative treatment is still the concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-56 (1936).
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in the chief judges of the circuits and in the Judicial Conference of
the United States.2 9 The implication of these provisions is that
the local plans should be consistent with the patterns of practice in
other districts. Carl Tobias has demonstrated that the review sys-
tem contemplated by the Act is, regrettably, almost inopera-
tive.2' Since his writing, the Judicial Conference has questioned
a circuit rule adopted by a U.S. Court of Appeals and induced
that court willingly to modify its rule to bring it into line with the
Rules Enabling Act.24 Nevertheless, the Judicial Conference and
the chief judges lack the resources in attention and energy to per-
form their role as reviewers of all local plans as envisioned by
CJRA. Their failure to perform this function more aggressively,
however, cannot be taken as an indication that it need not be
performed even by a reviewing court confronted with a provision
in a local plan that is at odds with the national law.
It is also significant that unlike the Rules Enabling Act enact-
ed in 1988, CJRA contains no supersession clause. Local plans,
unlike newly promulgated national rules, are therefore required
without exception to conform to all legislation enacted by Con-
gress. Moreover, it seems clear that the 1993 amendments to the
discovery rules, while they supersede no explicit provision of
CJRA, must surely supersede any local plans in conflict with those
amended rules. Thus, any plan that included disclosure require-
ments more onerous than those authorized by new Rule 26(a)(1)
seems to have been pro tanto superseded.242 In addition, the re-
cent amendment to Rule 83, made to conform that rule to the
1988 Act, must supersede any implication in CJRA that local plans
may be inconsistent with the national rules.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 474 (1994).
240. The Judicial Conference is a biennial meeting of judges, each of whom is over-
loaded with judicial work and who confronts at the meeting an agenda of staggering
length, many of the items being appalling in their insignificance. Its meetings are accord-
ingly dominated by work of the staff of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. See Carl Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 359, 363-67 (1995).
241. See Memorandum from Daniel R. Coquillette to Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with author).
242. Reasonable minds may differ on this point. Some districts, notably the Northern
District of California, require additional disclosures. The text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)
provides for disclosures "except to the extent directed by local rule." I read that to mean
that local rules can require disclosures to the extent provided in Rule 26(a), but not
more.
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If read to require continued obedience to existing national
law, CJRA is consistent with the action taken by Congress in 1988
when it commanded the federal courts to diminish the localism
creeping into the procedural system. If not so read, then Congress
speaks with a forked tongue and has almost simultaneously com-
manded that there shall be uniformity and diversity among the
districts.
Does the restrained interpretation of CJRA adopted by Robel
and the Civil Rules Committee leave the Act an empty vessel?
Hardly. There remains a substantial statutory program compatible
with the Federal Rules and the Rules Enabling Act. District courts
are authorized and expected to experiment with docket admin-
istration, case management, alternative dispute resolution, and the
uses of magistrate judges. All of these are quite consistent with
Federal Rule 16, as are novel systems of regulating lawyer mis-
conduct, such as the peer review system established in the Mon-
tana district court to punish discovery abuse.243 None of these
devices are likely to make a material difference in the cost of civil
litigation in most cases or in the law's delay, but any of them may
make a marginal difference, albeit perhaps at the cost of other
values of civil justice not addressed by CJRA. None of the mea-
sures so authorized are demonstrably inferior as cost or time sav-
ers to the devices included in the Eastern Texas Plan.
When and if Congress ever explicitly authorizes a district
court to depart from mandates of the Supreme Court, it will be
time to decide whether Congress has that power to subvert the
hierarchy of the federal judiciary. Meanwhile, I conclude that
CJRA did no such mischief: It did not authorize local plans in
defiance of national rules.
VI. THE NON-DELEGABILITY OF ARTICLE I
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO ARTICLE III JUDGES
A second line of objection to the fee-shifting offer of settle-
ment rule and the regulation of contingent fee contracts contained
in the Eastern Texas Plan is that such matters are not within the
narrow range suited to governance by a rule of court enacted by
an Article III court.




Martin Redish has brashly argued that all federal laws, wheth-
er substantive or procedural, must be enacted by Congress and
only by Congress.2' He contends that Article III courts may not
constitutionally make rules because rulemaking is a "striking de-
parture" from the process of deciding cases, which is the only
activity federal courts are commissioned by Article III to per-
form.24 His is a powerful if overstated point, often lost to view
by modems obsessed with the lawmaking effect of opinions of the
court.24 Although opinion-writing partakes of lawmaking, it is an
art confined by the particular dispute an opinion purports to de-
cide. Drafting legislation is more nearly a freehand art. To decide
an existing dispute framed by contending parties is an activity for
which the independence of the judiciary is a very useful qualifica-
tion; moreover, the public necessity of the decision affords moral
legitimacy to the act. On the other hand, to prescribe standards of
conduct by which future disputes will be judged is an activity for
which the independence of the judiciary from politics is a disquali-
fication wherever a republican form of government abides.247 For
these reasons and perhaps others, the distinction between Article I
and Article III institutions has substance requiring that it be ob-
served.
The distinction is, as must be acknowledged, sometimes mud-
dy. A source of muddiness has been the evolution of the concept
of federal common law. The Court has on occasion ventured to
decide cases on substantive principles having no visible basis in the
244. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 21 (2d ed. 1990).
245. Id. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity .... " U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
246. E.g., Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 813, 835
(1989) (arguing that the difference between Article I and Article III powers is not signif-
icant) [hereinafter Federal Common Law]. She finds these powers to be "coordinate." Id.
at 813. See also Martin Redish, Federal Common Law and American Political Theory: A
Response to Professor Weinberg, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 853 (1989); Louise Weinberg, The
Curious Notion That the Rules of Decision Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83
Nw. U. L. REv. 860 (1989).
247. The obligation to respect the institutions of self-government is not accepted by
Weinberg. Federal Common Law, supra note 246, at 845-46. She argues that congressio-
nal gridlock justifies the federal courts in taking matters into their own hands and mak-
ing any law they deem needed, Id. She is, of course, correct that Congress is often
gridlocked. Congress was designed by James Madison and his associates to gridlock, and
the electorate generally votes to ensure its continuance. See generally WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 113, 156 (1994).
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text of legislation.248 But in doing so, it has remained within the
framework of cases that the federal courts were obligated to de-
cide. There is no hint in the Court's opinions suggesting that it
could codify federal common law, however desirable such a codifi-
cation might be.
The constitutional restraint on rulemaking by courts comple-
ments the previously discussed constitutional restraint on congres-
sional intrusion into the internal affairs of the judiciary. While
Congress cannot displace the Supreme Court in the judicial hierar-
chy, neither can the federal courts displace Congress by legislating,
except with respect to matters intrinsic to their own routines.249
It is not necessary to rely on these inferences from the consti-
tutional text distinguishing Article I and Article III institutions
because the constitutional principle is also expressed in legislation.
That expression is found in the provisions of the Rules Enabling
Act explicitly forbidding the promulgation of rules modifying or
abridging substantive rights. Possibly that restrictive language is
redundant,"0 appearing as it does as part of a provision authoriz-
ing rulemaking only with respect to matters of practice and proce-
dure. But if redundant, it nevertheless stands as a confirmation by
Congress that the Court cannot enact a code governing the full
range of matters on which the federal government may legislate,
or even on the full range of matters that might arguably be classi-
fied as procedural for some other purposes. Whether the statute
expresses precisely the same limitation on the Court's rulemaking
authority as that arising by implication from the text of the Con-
stitution is an issue that has not arisen, and is of no present im-
portance. It is sufficient here to acknowledge that the statutory
proscription against substantive rules of court has constitutional
roots.
248. E.g., Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
249. See also Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial
Rulemaking: A Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REv. 41, 48-54 (1988). In re-
sponse to concerns voiced by Professor Whitten, the Civil Rules Committee flagged one
provision of its 1991 revision of Rule 4, calling the attention of Congress to the fact that
the power of the Court to promulgate such a rule was subject to question. See Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 110 S. Ct., Advance Sheet 1 at
lxxxviii (1989).
250. The sentence of 28 U.S.C. § 2072 forbidding the modification or abridgment of




The term "substance" as it appears in the Rules Enabling Act
is a famously elastic term. It has different meanings in different
contexts depending on the purpose for which the substance-proce-
dure distinction is made; I have demonstrated elsewhere four dif-
ferent meanings of the term merely in its applications to the Rules
* Enabling Act and the Rules of Decision Act as interpreted in
Erie2' In the present context, "substantive" seems to refer to
matters extrinsic to the work of Article III courts applying law to
facts. Conduct outside the courthouse having little or no bearing
on the functioning of the courts is not subject to governance by
rule of court. Laws governing such conduct must be made by
those who are politically accountable as Article III courts never
can be.
Precisely which matters are to be deemed substantive and
which matters are to be deemed procedural for the purpose of
judging the validity of a rule of court is a question largely remain-
ing open.2 Perhaps the most enlarged view of the universe of
procedure is presented by those persons, all of them academics,
who advocate "non-trans-substantive" rules of court.253 Their
idea, redolent of the common law forms of action, is that different
sets of rules might and ought be devised for different classes of
cases-that classifications be made according to the substance of
the disputes.' Leaving aside the merits of this suggestion, 
5
the question arises whether politically independent Article III
courts constitutionally can consider enacting such a procedural
code.
251. Carrington, supra note 228.
252. See 2 WRIGi-rr & MILLER, supra note 79, § 4509 (1990).
253. Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE LEJ. 718, 718 (1975), seems to have been the first proponent of this idea.
More recent expressions are Stempel, supra note 12, at 70-71; Subrin, supra note 70, at
2001; Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2220 (1989); Carl
Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1508
(1992).
254. This idea is to be distinguished from proposals that there be different rules for
cases involving smaller stakes; although sometimes referred to as non-trans-substantive,
such rules, which are familiar in the practice of most state courts, do not distinguish
cases according to the substantive nature of the disputes. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, The
Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A Comment on
Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. OF
LnrG. 113 (1994).
255. See Vices, supra note 63; Making Rules, supra note 55; Shapiro, supra note 65, at
1997; Marcus, supra note 56.
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An enlarged interpretation of the Court's authority to legislate
on all matters affecting the judiciary gains some support from the
fact that for much of the last two centuries, Congress has had little
time or attention to devote even to important matters of judicial
administration. Expansive interpretations of the power of the
Court to legislate may also reflect the dissatisfaction with Congress
that has caused the despair of many who interpret other powers of
the judiciary expansively 56 There is a tendency of some, perhaps
academic observers in particular, to suppose that if Congress will
not or cannot solve a problem, then it must be the prerogative of
courts to do so. This view sometimes assumes a wisdom of courts
that they may not possess, and disregards the constitutional reali-
ties that the incapacities of Congress are imposed by constitutional
design and generally reflect the indecision of the people, and that
the courts' independence unfits them for the tasks assigned to
Congress by Article I.
Like the corresponding limit on the power of Congress, the
limit on the power of the Court to enact substantive judicial legis-
lation remains largely untested. Congress has never tried explicitly
to confer power on the Supreme Court to enact substantive legis-
lation, and the Court has not made it a practice to enact plainly
substantive laws as rules of court, 7 For the most part, federal
civil rulemakers have observed the injunction uttered by Charles
Alan Wright in 1967 forbidding changes in procedure that deliber-
ately "affect substantive rights."5 8 To demonstrate that there is a
confining limit on what the Court can be authorized to do, it is
therefore again necessary to parade imaginary examples.
One example is suggested above. It seems clear the federal
courts could not constitutionally enact a code re-establishing forms
of action distinguishing different classes of claims according to the
different substantive rights invoked by claimants. To do so would
necessarily result in favoring some identifiable substantive claims
or defenses and disfavoring others. The choice as to whose rights
256. See, e'g, Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisitei" Amending the Constitution Out-
side Article V, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1043, 1076-87 (1986); Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking
Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 271-72 (1992).
257. See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REv. 693,
718-20 (1974) (suggesting that the Court should examine rules more cautiously in this re-
spect).
258. Charles A. Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L.
REv. 563, 568-69 (1967).
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should be preferred and given special procedural treatment is one
that a politically unaccountable and invulnerable institution has no
business making. To be sure, in deciding cases, Article III courts
every day make distinctions in the application of their generalized
rules of court, and some of these correspond to differences in the
substance of the cases they are deciding. But there is a difference
of constitutional import between making such distinctions in re-
sponse to the exigencies of deciding cases and making general,
prospective .rules that declare some people's rights to be more
important than other people's rights. Congress is therefore the
only forum to consider whether substance-specific rules of court
are needed. 9 Thus, Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure" serves a constitutional purpose.
Other imaginary examples merit consideration. Congress has
not authorized the Supreme Court to enact a general statute of
limitations setting time limits for the commencement of the full
range of federally created rights,' 61 and it perhaps could not do
so without inviting the Court to exceed the limits of activity suited
to an Article III institution. Nor does it seem that Congress could
authorize the Court to adopt or not, as federal rules of court,
every section of the Restatement, Second, of Judgments.2 62 Or to
enact rules regulating the seizure and sale of assets in the course
of execution of federal judgments263 to include such matters as
homestead exemptions and restrictions on wage assignments.
264
259. Cf. Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 671, 691 (1988). Kane points
to the Truth in Lending Act as an example of a successful petition to Congress on such
a matter, the Act was amended in 1982 to limit the impact of Rule 23. Id. at 691 n.142;
see 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1994).
260. FED. R. Civ. P. 2: "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action.'"
261. See Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More
Disparate Standard?, 71 GEo. L.J. 829, 850-51 (1983). In 1990, Congress took a first step
in dealing with the chaos of federal limitations law. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5114 (codified as amended 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994)).
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982).
263. In 1988, a section of the American Bar Association proposed just such a rule of
court; the Civil Rules Committee refused to consider it. One reason was the view held
by at least some members that such a rule would be substantive and should be enacted
by Congress.
264. FED. R. CIV. P. 64 conforms provisional remedies in federal court to state law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 69(a) conforms the procedure on execution to state law. For reasons
stated in this article, the Court is powerless to promulgate federal legislation on these
matters.
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Or to make laws applicable to all federal cases setting the fees
paid to attorneys or to expert witnesses by all parties. All these
subjects are for some purposes regarded as "procedural."' But
they also pertain to matters directly affecting the value of substan-
tive rights and are only incidentally connected to relations between
courts and lawyers or to conduct in court-the matters that are
the appropriate subjects of court rulemaking2
This is not to say that any Federal Rule touching on the
illustrative topics is invalid. There are several rules having margin-
al bearing on the statute of limitations; Rule 15(c), which provides
for the relation back of amendments, is an example. Other rules
bear on the preclusive effect of judgments; Rule 13(a), which
requires defendants to assert certain counterclaims is an example;
perhaps that Rule could go further and require joinder of related
claims by plaintiffs, as a Michigan state court rule does,267 but
surely the Court cannot by rule of court prescribe general
principles of issue preclusion. The court may regulate attorneys'
fees paid by a class in Rule 23 litigation as an incident to its pow-
er to approve class action settlements. But Rules 13, 15, and 23
are legitimate rules of pleading that are integral to a court's pro-
cess; the external consequences of these rules are incidental to the
solution of problems encountered in administering a process de-
signed to apply law to facts.m It was for this reason that Rule
19 withstood attack as a violation of the Rules Enabling Act; its
external consequences were merely incidents to a legitimate effort
of the rulemakers to provide guidance to federal courts when
parties present for decision only one part of a larger controver-
sy. 9 Similarly, Rule 35, which authorizes compulsory physical
and mental examinations, withstood attack despite its manifestly
extrinsic bearing on the personal injury plaintiff's privacy because
the invasion of privacy effected by the rule was incidental to the
265. See Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws,
42 YALE LU. 333, 336 (1933).
266. See Wright, supra note 258, at 568-71.
267. MIcH. R. Cr.-ST. 2.203(A)(1).
268. Rule 23 as amended in 1966 may also overstep the authority of the Court. See
Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Ac-
tions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL L. REV. 842, 849-61 (1974).
269. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968). Cf.
Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 497 F. Supp. 1105, 1108-21 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (holding
that Rule 25(a) is "procedural" under the Rules Enabling Act).
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entirely legitimate purpose of discerning the truth with respect to
controverted issues of fact."O And Rule 11 was upheld in its ap-
plication of sanctions on lawyers and unrepresented parties for
their inappropriate utterances in court. But there are limits to the
reach of these rules; it is at best doubtful that a rule of court
could mandate the imposition of sanctions on represented parties
for their negligence in pursuing unjust claims or asserting unfound-
ed defenses." If Rule 19 were recast, as some might wish, to
create a duty of nonparties to intervene in lawsuits possibly affect-
ing their interests,' or to define a concept of "virtual represen-
tation,"23 the rule would seem clearly beyond the pale of legiti-
mate court rulemaking. 4
Another example useful in the context of CJRA was offered
by Maurice Rosenberg; he distinguished court-system delay result-
ing from inaction by the court from lawyer-caused delay275 result-
ing from the mutual unreadiness of adversaries for the next step in
the process of adjudication. The former is a procedural problem
internal to the courts and is appropriately addressed by judicial
rulemakers; the latter is arguably too extrinsic to the administra-
tion of due process and is therefore not a problem to be regulated
by legislation enacted by an independent judiciary.
That a fee-shifting law is "substantive" for the purposes of the
present distinction seems reasonably clear. The Supreme Court has
held that it lacks authority to create fee-shifting rights even on a
case-by-case basis in the exercise of its equity powers. 6 A forti-
ori, it cannot legislate such laws by rule of court. This would seem
equally true with respect to legislation bearing on contingent fee
arrangements. If Congress desires fee-shifting offer of settlement
rules and limitations on contingent fees, it must itself take political
270. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1941).
271. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 564-69 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
272. 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 79, § 4452 (reviewing cases that suggest such a
possible duty).
273. Id. at § 4457 (describing the "virtual representation" theory in which a nonparty
is precluded if a party with adequately similar interests has tried the case).
274. Cf Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 351 U.S. 445,
451-53 (1956) (holding amended Rule 54(b) within court rulemaking power).
275. Maurice Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in
THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 29, 32-37 (Harry W. Jones ed.,
1965).
276. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975).
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responsibility for such enactments. Such a proposal is now pending
in Congress 7
I conclude that Congress cannot delegate to any Article III
court the power to enact fee-shifting offer of settlement laws. If
CJRA could be read as an attempt to repeal the limitation on
court rulemaking and authorize the federal courts to make laws
governing conduct extrinsic to the litigation process, it would be
unconstitutional. Thus, the Eastern Texas Plan, not only by disre-
garding its status as an inferior court but also by enacting sub-
stantive law, twice offended principles of separation of powers
embedded in the Rules Enabling Act of 1988, performing the
surprising feat of overreaching in one utterance the counterpart
constitutional authorities of Congress and the Supreme Court.
VII. FEE-SHIFTING RULES OF COURT FORBIDDEN BY
CONGRESS: THE UNCERTAIN VALIDITY OF RULE 68
Even if fee-shifting rules were not "substantive" for purposes
of the Rules Enabling Act and beyond the legislative competence
of an Article III institution, there is a further problem with the
Eastern Texas Plan that such rules are forbidden by an unrepealed
act of Congress. The Court has recently affirmed that by the 1853
Fee Act, "Congress meant to impose rigid controls on cost-shifting
in federal courts.""8 It has also held, contrary to the Eastern
Texas Plan, that expert witness fees are not taxable, even when
Congress has authorized the shifting of attorneys' fees.79 The
Sixth Circuit in invalidating a local rule with a fee-shifting provi-
sion resembling that of the Eastern District of Texas reviewed the
Supreme Court decisions and concluded thus:
In Crawford, the issue before the Court was whether federal
courts could require losing parties to pay compensation for the
prevailing party's expert witness fees in excess of the $30.00 per
day provided for in 29 U.S.C. § 1821. The Court held the district
court had no such power. The Court noted that "Title 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 now embodies Congress' considered choice as to the kinds
of expenses that a federal court may tax as costs against the
losing party," and that "the comprehensive scope" of the 1853
Fee Act and the faithfulness with which Congress has followed it
277. S. 672, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., tiL III, § 304 (1995).
278. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 444 (1987).
279. West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
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demonstrated to the Court "that Congress meant to impose rigid
controls on cost-shifting in federal courts." The Court went on to
hold that to read Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) as "a separate source of
power authorizing district courts to tax costs and expenses not
enumerated in § 1920" rendered that section superfluous, in that
courts could ignore it whenever they wished. Therefore, the
Court rejected such a reading and ruled that absent express stat-
utory authorization to the contrary, section 1920 defined the term
"costs" as used in Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
... If a general rule may be read in Alyeska Pipe Line and
its progeny, it is that the Supreme Court will not allow itself or
other federal courts to vary the uniform scheme of costs and fees
as set forth in the 1853 Fee Act, other than those narrowly de-
fined circumstances of cases involving bad faith or abusive lit-
igation, disobedience of court orders or the common fund doc-
trine.2°
If courts cannot make fee-shifting law even in the course of
deciding cases, what of Rule 68? It seems certain that the Eastern
Texas Plan was an outcome of years of debate over the proper
content of that rule. That debate has been conducted with little, if
any, regard for the constitutional and statutory limits of the
rulemaking power. Arguably, Rule 68 was invalid, if not because it
was unconstitutionally promulgated, then because it violated a
substantive act of Congress that procedural rulemakers were not
commissioned to supersede. It has become timely to consider such
issues.
As originally promulgated in 1938, Rule 68 enabled defen-
dants to avoid liability for taxable costs, and to impose liability for
taxable costs on a plaintiff, by making an offer of judgment that is
more favorable than that obtained by the plaintiff after trial. This
was a rule of little consequence because the costs taxable under
section 1920 in 1938 were modest."' The rule imposed an incen-
tive to settle on plaintiffs, but an incentive so minuscule as to be
280. Tiedel v. Northwestern Mich. College, 865 F.2d 88, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1988).
281. Section 1920 lists six categories of taxable costs. These include fees of the clerk
and marshal, fees of the court reporter for transcripts obtained for use at trial, witness
fees, printing and copying charges, docket fees, and compensation of special court officers
such as interpreters. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)-(6) (1994). There is nothing in § 1920 to suggest
shifting of attorneys' fees. See iL On the history of payment of costs, see Philip M.
Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Courts, 21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935).
The Court in Marek noted that there were in 1938 some federal laws shifting fees as
"costs." Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985).
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almost inconsequential. The rule was almost inoperative for four
decades.
The rule was not in any useful sense a rule of "pleading and
practice" as the 1934 Act authorized the Court to make.3 The
rule had little to do with what happens in court or between judges
and lawyers or their clients; it did nothing to increase the like-
lihood that a court's judgment would be the product of a correct
application of law to accurately determined facts. Its apparent aim
was to induce settlement out of court without regard for the mer-
its. Social peace and the informal resolution of disputes are, of
course, positive values, but they are not aspects of due process of
law and are not integral to the work of the courts. The pursuit of
social peace is assuredly a proper object of ordinary Article I
legislation, at least with respect to matters that are within federal
cognizance, but it is not a proper object of legislative enactments
by politically independent, invulnerable Article III courts.
The facts that the original Civil Rules Advisory Committee
recommended Rule 68 in 1938 and that the Supreme Court pro-
mulgated it create a presumption in favor of its validity.2 To
the extent that the original Rule 68 conflicted with section 1920, it
could have superseded that 1853 legislation, if, but only if, it was a
rule of "pleading and practice" that the Court was authorized to
promulgate by the 1934 Act. But the issue of Rule 68's character,
so far as it appears, was never discussed by the rulemakers of
1938. Charles Clark, as Reporter for the Committee, had staff
responsibility for keeping the committee within its prescribed role;
admirable as his performance as reporter was, he was sometimes
careless in failing to call to the committee's attention statutory and
constitutional limits on its authority. For example, the legislative
282. There were no reported federal cases before 1978 in which fees were treated as
part of the costs shifted under Rule 68. Marek, 473 U.S. at 20-21 (Brennan, J., dissent-
iag.); cf. Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
283. The 1934 Act authorized the Court to "prescribe, by general rules ... the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure [of the district
courts of the United States] in civil actions at law." Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48
Stat. 1064.
284. See Burlington Northern R.R v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987); Peter Westen &
Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 311, 364 (1980); cf Ralph U. )Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and
Reappraisal After Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1, 1-2




history of the 1934 Act gave assurance that no statute of limita-
tions would be promulgated pursuant to it.2 Yet Clark advocat-
ed that Rule 3' be drafted as a provision of limitations law fix-
ing the filing of a complaint as a commencement of an action for
the purpose of its timeliness; such a rule would have been at odds
with the limitations laws of states requiring that, in addition to
filing, a summons had to be served on the defendant within the
statutory period.7 Such a rule would not have been a rule of
"practice and pleading" such as the 1934 Act authorized the Court
to promulgate; and had the Act authorized such a rule, it would
have been of dubious constitutionality. Clark's recommendation
was wisely resisted by the chairman of the Committee on the
ground that such a rule would exceed the committee's authority
under the Act." Clark's text of Rule 3 was retained, but merely
for use as a measure of the timeliness of other events occurring at
later stages in the litigation, such as the filing of a motion for
summary judgment.29
There was no comparable consideration of Clark's proposed
Rule 68. Had there been, perhaps the Committee sitting in 1938
would have considered the limits of rule enablement and also the
interface of the Rules with section 1920. As noted above, the 1938
Rules contained a provision in Rule 54 superseding the mandatory
language of section 1920, a supersession to which Congress acced-
ed in 1948." Perhaps Rule 68, like Rule 54, can be taken as
having superseded section 1920 to the minor extent that there was
conflict with it.29 The difficulty with using the supersession
clause to save Rule 68 is that the clause applies only to genuine
rules of "practice and procedure," not at all to rules "abridging or
modifying" substantive rights. But as long as no more was at stake
285. S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1926).
286. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 still provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint."
287. E.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531 (1949)
(discussing KAN. GEN STATS. 1935, § 60-306).
288. See Burbank, supra note 39, at 1159-1160 & n.619.
289. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
290. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
291. The advisory committee's note to Rule 54(d) refers to the statutory predecessor
of § 1920 as "unaffected by this rile." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) advisory committee's note.
Curiously, there is no reference to the statute in the advisory committee's note to Rule
68.
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than the peanuts that were taxable costs under the statute, it was
worth no one's trouble to raise the issue.
Beginning in the 1970s, perhaps at the behest of Chief Justice
Warren Burger,' the rulemakers began to reconsider Rule 68
and proposed to put some real teeth in it. Drafts were circulated
that would have added attorneys' fees to the taxable costs paid by
a plaintiff rejecting a favorable offer.293 These proposals gave rise
to a storm of controversy,294 with strong criticism coming from
those most concerned with protecting the interests of plaintiffs.295
Again curiously underdeveloped in that debate, as it had been in
the 1930s, was the question whether the Court had been empow-
ered by the Rules Enabling Act to legislate a fee-shifting rule at
odds with section 1920, or whether if the Act did purport to con-
fer such power, it was an unconstitutional delegation of an Article
I power and responsibility to an Article III institution.296 Never-
theless, without forcing these issues, those protesting the
rulemakers' drafts prevailed with the committee, who in 1985
tabled further consideration of Rule 68. The imbroglio in which
the Committee involved itself ought be taken as instruction that
the issues raised by offer-of-settlement rules have too much politi-
cal content to be wisely managed by rule of court.29
Meanwhile, however, the Supreme Court in Marek v.
Chesny298 partially effected Chief Justice Burger's objective by
holding that Rule 68 cuts off the recovery of post-offer attorney
fees under a fee-shifting statute that described such fees as costs
taxable under section 1920.299 This did not include all the stat-
292. Roy Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 4 n.7 (1985)
(noting the Chief Justice's lobbying efforts in the 1980s on behalf of a stronger Rule 68).
293. Id. at 10-12, 17.
294. Id. at 17-19.
295. See Note, The Conflict Between Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Statute: Reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act, 98 HARV. L. REV. 828, 846 (1985). See
generally Stephen B. Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68--Time to Abandon Ship, 19
U. MICH. J. L. REF. 425 (1986) (criticizing the advisory committee's repeated efforts to
reform Rule 68).
296. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see
Burbank, supra note 295, at 430-31.
297. See, eg., Geoffrey P. Miller, An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 93 (1986) (examining the wealth redistribution effects of Rule 68).
298. 473 U.S. 1 (1985); see also Roy D. Simon, Jr., The New Meaning of Rule 68:
Marek v. Chesny and Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 475 (1986) (examin-
ing Marek and its effect of revitalizing Rule 68).
299. See Marek, 473 U.S. at 43-48 (appendix to Justice Brennan's dissent).
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utes in which Congress had provided for fee-shifting because
sometimes it has characterized its fee-shifting as part of the costs,
and sometimes it has not. There was no visible explanation for
these differing choices of legislative diction. And, of course, the
traditional American rule3" prevails in the absence of any explic-
it direction from Congress. The result of Marek is a bizarre pat-
tern; Rule 68 has real bite in civil rights cases" and other cases
arising under statutes providing for taxation of fees as part of the
section 1920 costs, but many plaintiffs asserting federal rights that
are explicitly subject to fee-shifting are not subject to the threat of
an offer of settlement because the statutes they invoke do not
contain the magic words "as costs." Thus, while plaintiffs in civil
rights cases are exposed to fee-shifting under Rule 68 because the
civil rights legislation shifts fees as part of the costs, plaintiffs in
an action brought under the Fair Housing Act' or the Equal
Pay Act3 °3 are not so exposed because those acts, while provid-
ing for fee-shifting, fail to denote them as "costs., '3' As a ques-
tion of separation of powers, this result is not seriously troubling
because the Marek scheme rests on an interpretation of the Civil
Rights Act. While the interpretation of the Civil Rights Act may
seem tortured, the Court has not claimed for itself the power on
its own to legislate a fee-shifting offer-of-settlement rule.
In deciding Marek, the Court silently upheld Rule 68. The
court of appeals had decided that Rule 68 if interpreted as a fee-
shifting rule would exceed the authority conferred by the Rules
Enabling Act.315 The three dissenters in the Supreme Court ag-
reed.3 ' The majority did not address the issue because it relied
300. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 5 U.S. (5 Dall.) 306 (U.S. 1796). See generally John
Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., winter 1984, at 9 (providing a historical analysis of the development
of the American rule).
301. The problem arises from the interface of Rule 68 with the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). See Victoria C. Choy,
Note, The Impact of Proposed Rule 68 on Civil Rights Litigation, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
719, 739-42 (1984); Note, supra note 295 (examining the conflict between Rule 68 and §
1988).
302. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1994).
303. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988).
304. For a compilation of the fee-shifting statutes, see the appendix to Justice
Brennan's dissenting opinion in Marek. Marek v. Chesny, 493 U.S. 1, 22, 43-51 (1985).
305. Chesny v. Marek, 720 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1983).
306. Marek, 493 U.S. at 15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Marshall, J. and
Blackmun, J.).
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on the Civil Rights Act rather than the Rules Enabling Act for its
legitimation of the fee-shifting it imposed. The case is not authori-
ty for the existence of a power in the Supreme Court to enact the
rule embodied in the Eastern Texas Plan which would shift fees
when there is no color of congressional authority to do so, but to
the contrary indicates that any judge-made legislation bearing on
the shifting of fees must be fully and carefully reconciled to the
utterances of Congress, such as those embodied in the Fees Act.
In 1992, the Civil Rules Committee again considered Rule 68,
this time working off the draft suggested by Judge William
Schwarzer, Director of the Federal Judicial Center.3" This pro-
posal was in one sense less politically sensitive and hence less sub-
stantive than the old rule because it gave a similar power to ex-
tend offers to plaintiffs, thus equalizing the incentives to settle.
Yet it was clearly subject to the same objection as the old rule as
a misuse of the rulemaking power. Rule 68 ought to be repealed;
this would have the benign effect of eliminating the crazy quilt
created by the decision in Marek and would place the issue before
Congress, where it belongs, and where it now pends.0 8
In a significant respect, the initiative of Chief Justice Burger
and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules with respect to Rule
68 was a product of its time. As noted above, there was a time in
the mid-1960s when judicial rulemaking seemed to be the object of
universal acclaim. In 1965, the Court decided Hanna v. Phi-
mer,319 laying to rest concerns that the Rules would be made to
yield on a wide range of matters to state law.310 In 1966, an
amendment to Rule 23 vastly enlarged the utility of the class ac-
tion device, with significant radiating consequences for the worth
307. See Schwarzer, supra note 235. Judge Schwarzer's plan was based in part on
theoretical work reported in Symposium, Attorney Fee Shifting, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., winter 1984, at 1. See also John J. Donahue, III., The Effects of Fee Shifting on
the Settlement Rate: Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 195 (using economic models to evaluate the
effects of fee shifting on the likelihood of settlement).
308. See S. 672, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
309. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
310. See e.g., Bernard C. Gavit, States Rights' and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 1
(1949) (arguing that the Erie doctrine should not be extended "into the field of federal
procedure"); Edward L. Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 711, 725 (1950) ("[T]here are many . . . Rules . . . which are
susceptible to rejection or delimitation as a result of the current extensions of the Erie
doctrine to matters which heretofore have been considered strictly procedural.").
1996]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
of numerous claims and defenses.3 ' Work commenced on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Few questioned any of these develop-
ments as possible overreachings. It was easy to think that courts
could legislate on almost any subject if there was any remote
connection to judicial administration.
Times have changed. Beginning with the rejection of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence by Congress in 1972,12 there has been
growing friction over procedural lawmaking. Several wise observers
expressed caution about the absence of democratic representation
in the process.313 The 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling
Act took some modest steps, as many perhaps as can be taken
consistently with the elitist premises of Article III, to open the
process to influence by those affected by rulemaking decisions.
314
Congress in the 1980s became less deferential, amending Rule
4315 and Rule 35316 on its own, almost deciding to lay aside the
promulgated amendments to Rule 26 in 1993.31" Also in the
1980s, elements of the bar became exercised about the 1983
amendment of Rule 11318 and the revision of Rule 68 as pro-
posed in the 1983 and 1984. Bar sentiments reached a crescendo in
1993 over the amendments of the discovery rules.319 On the aca-
311. For an account of the amendment and its effects, see Arthur R. Miller, Of Fran-
kenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92
HARV. L. REv. 664 (1979).
312. See Federal Rules of Evidence Act, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
313. See Ronan E. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARV. L. REV.
275, 282-301 (1962); Lesnick, supra note 180, at 582; WEINSTEIN, supra note 116, at
101-04.
314. Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642; see Making Rules,
supra note 55, at 2076.
315. Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96 Stat. 2527; see Kent Sinclair, Service
of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule
4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1194-1212 (1987) (describing the evolution of Rule 4); see
also Linda S. Mullenix, The New Federal Express: Mail Service of Process Under Amend-
ed Rule 4, 4 REV. LITIG. 299 (1985) (examining the courts' treatment of problems that
arose under the 1983 Rule 4 amendments during the two years following their enact-
ment); Ralph U. Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on Judicial Rulemaking: A
Case Study of Federal Rule 4, 40 ME. L. REV. 41 (1988) (examining the restraints that
the separation of powers doctrine imposes on supervisory rulemaking by the Supreme
Court in the context of Rule 4). On later efforts to revise Rule 4, see Paul D.
Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 733 (1988).
316. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4401.
317. For a fuller account, see Carrington, supra note 236.
318. For discussion of the complaints, see 2 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 79, §
1332 (1990).
319. Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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demic side, as noted, some commentators concluded that some of
the rules should be rewritten to have different applications to
different classes of cases, according to the substantive nature of
claims or defenses presented;3' this was a feat that Congress
would have to perform. Accordingly, it seems fair to say that the
scheme established by the Rules Enabling Act is presently embat-
tled.32'
Given this sea change, it is likely that a prudent Supreme
Court would be cautious about claiming extravagant powers to
enact fee-shifting law derived from the sparse language of the
Rules Enabling Act. It is more likely at present than in the past
to observe scrupulously the bounds to its lawmaking authority and
responsibility.3' It can reasonably be expected wisely to avoid
being thrust into the cockpit of factional politics raging over the
extent to which individuals should be encouraged or discouraged
to bring their grievances to federal courts. A fee-shifting offer-of-
settlement rule not rooted in a statute such as section 1920, or the
fee-shifting statutes such as those relied upon in Marek, is there-
fore one that the Court would not itself claim the power to pro-
mulgate, at least in the absence of explicit authorization from
Congress.
The requirement that judge-made legislation be nonsubstan-
tive-the requirement explicit in the Rules Enabling Act-must be
implicit in CJRA. There is nothing in CJRA suggesting that Con-
gress was at the time of its enactment indifferent to this restraint
on the delegability of its power and authority to politically insensi-
tive Article III institutions. Nor is there a word in CJRA suggest-
ing an intent to authorize the modification of section 1920. It
cannot be casually inferred that Congress intends others to per-
form its role, especially perhaps when the others have their own
constitutional roles and limitations, as Article III courts do. If and
when Congress explicitly authorizes federal courts to codify fee-
26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing?" 46 HASTINGS LJ. 679, 726-27 (1995).
320. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
321. See generally Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75
JUDICATURF 161 (1991); Marcus, supra note 56; Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experi-
ence: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795,
855-57 (1991).
322. For an example of such scruples, see Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co.,
484 U.S. 97 (1987) (holding that the Court did not have authority to create its own rule
authorizing service of process).
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shifting laws in contravention of the ancient Fees Act, it will be
time to consider fully the constitutional considerations advanced
here; but meanwhile, it is correct to conclude that CJRA does not
authorize local plans to shift or limit fees of lawyers or their ex-
pert witnesses, or otherwise tinker with the provisions of section
1920.
VIII. THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE
POWER UNDER ARTICLE I
Eastern Texas seems also bent on violating the principles of
our federalism. Like the separation of powers principles discussed
above, the federalism principle is also expressed in ancient and
controlling federal legislation that remains untested. Now embod-
ied in section 1652, the Rules of Decision Act-originally Section
34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789-requires federal courts to regard
"the laws of the several states" as the rules of decision in civil
actions "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require. ' '31 Explicit as was
the attention given in the Constitution to limiting the legislative
power of Congress, the principle of the Rules of Decision Act was
an almost necessary implication of Article I.324 It belonged in the
first Judiciary Act in the same way that the provision forbidding
the promulgation of rules of court modifying or abridging substan-
tive rights belonged in the Rules Enabling Act.3' With respect
to the problem at hand, both are cautionary surplusage.326
323. The history of this provision has been the subject of extended debate. See, e.g.,
WILFRED J. RITz, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: Expos-
ING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt & L. H.
LaRue eds., 1990); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of
Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79
(1993); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789,
37 HARv. L. REV. 49 (1923).
324. See Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act:
In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356, 358 (1977); Martin H.
Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretative Process: An
"Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 761, 763 (1989).
325. For recent exegesis on the Act, see Burbank, supra note 103; William A. Fletch-
er, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example
of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513 (1984).
326. The Rules of Decision Act is declared to be a "truism" by one commentator.
Peter Westen, After "Life for Erie"--A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 982 n.45 (1980).
There is a rich academic literature on the Rules of Decision Act, chiefly bearing on its
effect as a limitation on judge-made law. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
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As the reader knows, a cloud was placed over the Act in 1842
by the decision of the Court in Swift v. Tyson,3' which interpret-
ed "laws of the several states" to include only statutes and claimed
on behalf of the Court the power to fashion a general federal
common law applicable to cases litigated in federal court and not
governed by state legislation. Justice Stephen Field was the first to
call attention to the fact that the Court was fashioning legal doc-
trine that the Congress itself was not empowered to enact; he
foretold that the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson would "die among its
worshippers."328 In 1909, John Chipman Gray published his
scorching attack on the intellectual premises of Swift.329 The in-
terpretation was again assailed in 1928 by Justice Holmes, who de-
scribed it as an "unconstitutional assumption of powers by the
Courts of the United States."33 It was at last reversed in Erie,
with Justice Brandeis for the Court emphasizing that "[i]f only a
question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout
nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued
has now been made clear and compels us to do so."33'
The Erie doctrine went through an extended period of refor-
mulation. At one time, it seemed likely to destroy the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by requiring the application of state
procedural law at every significant turn. The threat was posed by
Justice Frankfurter's formulation of an "outcome determinative
test" requiring that state laws be applied in federal litigation if
they might affect the outcome.32 Henry Friendly described this
test as "overly enthusiastic";333 Charles Clark described it as tak-
ing a good idea "to an absurd extreme."'  In reaction against
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883 (1986); Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1985); Redish & Phillips,
supra note 324; Steven D. Smith, Courts, Creativity and the Duty to Decide a Case, 1985
U. ILLY L. REv. 573 (1985).
327. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
328. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 403 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting).
329. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 251-56 (2d ed.
1972).
330. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
331. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (footnote omitted).
332. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
333. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 402 (1964).
334. Charles E. Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights: To a More Per-
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this period of "over-enthusiasm," some questioned the constitution-
al basis for the Erie decision,335 but the prevailing view among
contemporary commentators is that Erie does indeed rest on a
constitutional base that, like the separation of powers principles
discussed above, remains untested and indeterminate.336
Justice Brandeis was not explicit in explaining the constitution-
al principle he invoked; he almost seemed to rely on the Tenth
Amendment as its source. The Constitution, however, was again
referred to as a basis for the decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic
Co. of America,337 which applied Vermont law rather than the
Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 to determine the arbitrability of a
local dispute. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in that case
explained the constitutional problem to be the absence of any
authorization in Article I for the federal government to impose its
substantive enactments on litigants on no basis other than their
presence in a federal court;33 8 he did not rely upon the Tenth
Amendment for the principle that the federal government is one
of limited power and responsibility. This was also the point ac-
knowledged by the Court in Hanna v. Plumer,339 its decision lay-
ing to rest concerns that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
could not be applied to cases to be decided according to state
law.' Frankfurter's Bernhardt proposition has since gained gen-
eral acceptance, although there have been no recent occasions for
its application.
Although given little emphasis in the Court's brief utterances
regarding the constitutional basis of Erie, there likely is an equal
protection consideration lending added significance to the absence
fect Union, 40 TEX. L. REV. 211, 220 (1961).
335. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omni-
presence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.i. 267, 273 (1946); Philip B. Kurland, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and The Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67
YALE L.J. 187, 188-204 (1957); see also Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and The Consti-
tution, 53 Nw. U. L. REv. 427, 428 (1958) (positing that "the post-Erie line of cases has
taken an unduly rigid course which does not adequately allow for the variety and com-
plexity of the problems encountered in diversity litigation").
336. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 700-06
(1974); Friendly, supra note 333, at 384-98; Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 489, 509-10 (1954); Westen & Lehman, supra
note 284, at 338-44, 353-56.
337. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
338. Id. at 208.
339. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
340. Id. at 471-72.
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of authorization in Article I. It is irrational to impose two differ-
ent bodies of substantive law on an event or transaction solely on
the basis of which of two courts having concurrent jurisdiction
over a dispute arising from that event or transaction comes to
exercise that jurisdiction; arbitrarily discriminatory results occur be-
cause of the citizenship of the disputants opening or closing the
door to the federal court. This consideration serves to explain why
the Constitution does not enumerate among the powers of Con-
gress the making of substantive law to govern disputes brought to
the federal courts. To legislate conditionally on a happenstance of
the forum selected can effectively serve no purpose of the national
government, and disserves the purposes of state government by
interfering with even-handed application of state law.
Yet, as Hanna v. Plumer demonstrated and as all acknowl-
edge, the federal government does retain substantial control over
the conduct of proceedings in its courts. The line to be drawn to
limit federal power resembles, but is not necessarily the same as,
the line defining the limits of permissible delegation of legislative
authority to Article III institutions. If a law in question bears on
the process of applying law to fact, on events occurring in the
federal courthouse as part of that process, or on relations between
federal courts and counsel, there can be no question of the validity
of a federal enactment. But as the relationship between a purport-
edly procedural law and the constitutional function of the Article
III institution becomes attenuated, a serious question begins to
arise.
Thus, in the context of facts such as those presented in Erie,
if Congress were to enact a statute limiting recovery of trespassers
to land to damages intentionally caused by the landowner, the
statute would exceed the powers of Congress enumerated in Arti-
cle I, and would neither be binding on state courts nor be given
effect by federal courts. Congress has the undoubted power to
regulate the tort liability of interstate carriers to trespassers on
their rights-of-way because the presence of interstate commerce
provides a basis in Article I for such legislation. Or to take a
contemporary instance, if Congress were to enact a statute requir-
ing courts to issue injunctions forbidding school children from
taking guns to school, 1 the legislation would not be binding on
341. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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state or federal courts, at least not in the absence of a demonstrat-
ed connection between guns in school and one of the responsibili-
ties of Congress enumerated in Article I. Neither of these imagi-
nary laws would be saved by restricting their operation to cases
brought to the federal courts in the exercise of the diversity juris-
diction. Indeed, for the reasons stated above, such a discrimination
based on the happenstance of state citizenships of parties would
elevate constitutional concerns. No coherent federal policy would
be achieved while state law on the subject would be made inco-
herent.
By the same token, Congress has no power to enact a law
imposing a general offer-of-settlement rule such as Rule 68 on all
disputes arising between citizens or residents of the United States.
If hyperlexis is a national problem, it is not one that Congress can
address so directly without overstepping the limits of its powers
under Article I. Nor can Congress regulate all contingent fee con-
tracts between lawyers and their clients without regard for the
relation or lack of relation between the legal services engaged and
any of the enumerated powers of Congress. Nor can it reverse the
American rule and adopt for all cases, state or federal, the English
rule that losers pay winners' attorneys' fees rule in all cases be-
cause the general rule regarding fee-shifting is not within the enu-
merated powers of Congress; it is, therefore, a matter generally
reserved to the states. The Court has explicitly acknowledged the
primacy of state law with respect to fee-shifting in diversity litiga-
tion. 42 No doubt laws regulating contingent fees or adopting the
English rule could be constitutionally enacted by Congress if appli-
cable only to disputes arising from the enforcement of federal law
or as incidents of a regulation of interstate commerce in a field
such as products liability.
Less clear is the power of the federal government to enact a
fee-shifting offer-of-settlement rule applicable to all cases litigated
in federal courts, without regard to the source of the substantive
rights being contested. The power of Congress to attach fee-shift-
ing rules to the federal claims and defenses it creates can scarcely
be questioned. But the same reasoning advanced above to explain
why the enactment of fee-shifting rules is for Congress, not for the
Court under the Rules Enabling Act, can also be marshalled to
explain why, with respect to diversity cases, the issue must be
342. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975).
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controlled by state rather than federal law. The policy is one over
which state legislatures, not Congress, have the final say.43 Fee-
shifting rules arguably have too little bearing on the courthouse
conduct of federal litigants and too much bearing on the value of
the substantive rights and defenses created by state law to be
mere features of federal judicial administration. If, for example,
the state of Texas seeks to encourage its citizens to bring their
grievances over alleged spite fences, defamations, or repudiations
of unilateral contracts to courts, it is not the place of any branch
of the federal government to prevent such a public policy by re-
moving the litigation to a federal court in which stern incentives
will be imposed to induce the parties to settle without an adjudica-
tion on the merits.
A recent example of the problem is S.A. Healy Co. v. Mil-
waukee Metropolitan Sewerage District.3' The Seventh Circuit
there affirmed the application of a Wisconsin fee-shifting offer-of-
settlement rule benefitting plaintiffs to a plaintiff who had invoked
diversity jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Wisconsin law
was substantive and not in conflict with Rule 68.4 The court
noted that failure to apply the Wisconsin law would give rise to
forum-shopping opportunities of the sort that the Erie principle
sought to minimize and did nothing to "impair the integrity of
federal procedure."' 4 If Rule 68 had been read to forbid fee-
shifting offer-of-settlement rules for plaintiffs, the court would then
have had to decide whether Rule 68 was authorized by the Rules
Enabling Act and, if so, whether Congress had such a power to
confer on the Court the power as rulemaker. This was the issue
avoided by the Court in Marek.
While that issue remains doubtful, there seems less doubt
about a federal law that applies only to diversity cases. Thus, the
proposed Common Sense Law Reform Act of 1995'4 contained
at least one provision that would seem to violate the constitutional
principle announced by Justice Brandeis. It proposed to enact the
343. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 258 at 571-74.
344. 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1995).
345. ld. at 310-11.
346. Id. at 310.
347. This proposal first appeared in the report of the Council on Competitiveness
Recommendation 36 and in H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995). For comment
on the fee-shifting provisions of the act, see Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Le-
gal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699, 729-31 (1995).
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English rule for diversity cases brought to federal court by plain-
tiffs. Happily, this idea seems to have been abandoned when its
proponents recognized how unsuitable a proposal it was. It pre-
sented plaintiffs with a premier opportunity to engage in forum-
shopping; those with promising cases would have compelling rea-
son to seek federal jurisdiction. Some plaintiffs would win large
fee awards because they were fortunate enough to be able to
invoke federal jurisdiction; others would not have access to such
awards for the arbitrary reason that they were citizens of the
wrong state. Plaintiffs intimidated by the prospect of paying the
defendants' attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees would simply
avoid federal courts. No coherent federal policy would be
achieved, and state law would be significantly disrupted. The inco-
herence would be less if the fee-shifting rule also applied to re-
moved cases, but that would make the removal jurisdiction the
battleground that it was a century ago while magnifying the dis-
ruption of state law.
I diffidently conclude that Congress may lack power to enact
a fee-shifting rule designed to induce settlement of all civil cases
in federal courts, and almost certainly lacks the power to enact a
fee-shifting rule fashioned to induce settlement only of diversity
cases.' If CJRA is found to authorize plans having the latter
effect, I would expect the Court to hold it pro tanto unconstitu-
tional.
IX. CJRA AND THE EFFICACY OF STATE LAW
Congress can and sometimes does provide for fee-shifting in
actions brought to enforce rights it creates. It chose to do so when
it enacted the Clean Water Act,' 9 which provided the subject of
the dispute in Friends of the Earth. The district court recognized
that its Plan, if applied to the plaintiff in that case, would partially
frustrate the purpose of the statute and wisely concluded that it
should therefore be withheld from operation in Clean Water Act
348. Caution is indicated in part because the Court has been so deferential to Con-
gress on issues of federalism, to the point indeed of raising an issue of a possible neglect
of duty. William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REV.
1709 (1985). The recent Lopez case, cited supra note 341, is heartening in showing that
the Court is still a responsible force in this field. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624 (1995).
349. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1995).
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cases.3 11 What the court failed to acknowledge is that its rule will
in every instance of its application have a similar substantive effect
on rights and defenses established either by Congress, by a state,
or by a foreign country whose law is applicable by reason of a
choice of law made pursuant to state law. For a federal court to
so modify substantive rights created by state law is contrary to the
Rules of Decision Act. Because it is also quite possibly unconstitu-
tional, the power to impose such burdens on state-created rights
cannot be inferred from CJRA.
There is an analogy to contemporary developments in federal
arbitration law having an adverse effect on the enforceability of
state law, developments that have likely sensitized the Court to
the problem of federal obstructions to the enforcement of state
law. In Southland Corporation v. Keating,35l the Court, in an ex-
cess of enthusiasm for arbitration, extended the 1925 Federal Arbi-
tration Act to make it applicable in cases in state courts affecting
interstate commerce. It also held that the Act preempted state
laws invalidating arbitration clauses contained in contracts of adhe-
sion that extended jurisdictions of arbitral tribunals to disputes
arising in the private enforcement of state legislation 2 The
Court had earlier reinterpreted the 1925 Act: For over four de-
cades, it had been a law bearing on the administration of the
federal courts, but it became, without any utterance issuing from
Congress, a law regulating interstate commerce. 3  The further
extensions of the Act in Southland weakened private enforcement
of state law. This was not justified by the text or history of the
federal act. It was also improvident and quite unnecessary to
achieve any federal purpose that can be aligned with Article I. In
1994, twenty state attorneys general petitioned the Court to over-
rule Southland 4.3  The Court declined to do so, but with the ma-
jority sheepishly admitting that Southland might well have been
wrong. The fundamental error of the Court in Southland was con-
sistent with the degeneration of American courts as instruments of
350. Friends of the Earth v. Chevron Chemical Co., 885 F. Supp. 934, 939-40 (E.D.
Texas 1995).
351. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
352. Id. at 16.
353. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). For an
account of this development, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REF-
ORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 169-79 (1992).
354. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1995).
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law enforcement; the Court's error was that it attached so little
importance to private law enforcement that it did not recognize
the injury it was doing to the law of California; it was momentari-
ly blind to the fact that arbitrators do not necessarily enforce legal
rights and are not accountable for their failures to enforce them. If
California, in the belief that law courts are more faithful to the
law than arbitral tribunals, wants the rights it creates to be en-
forceable in court, there is no legitimate federal purpose achieved
by preventing California from acting on that quite reasonable
belief unless the California law in question conflicts with or is
preempted by substantive federal legislation. If there is cost or
delay associated with enforcement in court, the task of balancing
those adverse consequences against the benefits of superior law
enforcement is a political issue of the purest sort, and one that
California is surely entitled, as a general matter, to make for itself.
Likewise, if California or any other state disfavors a fee-shifting
offer-of-settlement rule, it is no business of Congress to impose its
different preference on cases involving enforcement of state-creat-
ed rights when no substantive federal law is imperilled.
Insofar as the federal arbitration law is being applied to trans-
actions in interstate commerce, Southland was merely wrong and
not unconstitutional. And the Court has impliedly acknowledged
that the federal arbitration law cannot be made applicable to the
litigation of state-created claims that involve disputes not affecting
interstate commerce.355 That leaves the question of its application
in a diversity case when the dispute is one not within reach of the
commerce power. The Court has decided one such case; in the
halcyon days of Erie, it held that a federal court must in a case
beyond the reach of the commerce power give effect to state law
restricting the parties' power to make binding agreements to arbi-
trate future disputes.356 That decision remains good law, resting
as it does on a sound principle of constitutional federalism.357 By
the same token, state law with respect to offers of settlement are
355. Id. at 839-41; cf. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987).
356. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
357. For a case discussing Bernhardt, see Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics,
Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 404-05 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). The court
in Robert Lawrence presaged the holding of the Supreme Court in Prima Paint. It rein-
terpreted the 1925 Arbitration Act as an exercise of the commerce power in the belief
that it would be unconstitutional to apply the act to actions in federal court merely on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 404.
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binding on federal courts, at least until Congress says otherwise in
the exercise of one of its Article I powers.
The analogous, if lesser, effect of a fee-shifting offer of settle-
ment rule on the worth of rights and defenses created by state law
is demonstrated by comparing Friends of the Earth with Marek v.
Chesny. Pursuant to the latter decision interpreting Rule 68 and
the Civil Rights Act, the offer-of-settlement rule has fee-shifting
effect only when Congress has so provided in legislation having an
independent federal purpose linked to one of the enumerated
Article I powers of Congress. To the extent that the Eastern Tex-
as rule applies to cases in which Congress has voted to tax
attorneys' fees as part of the "costs" awarded to a prevailing party
under Rule 68, it is redundant. To the extent that the Plan might
have been applicable to other disputes arising under federal law,
the Plan would arm with an offer rule parties whom, the Supreme
Court inferred in Marek, Congress does not want so armed, either
because it has made no provision for fee-shifting or because it has
required fee shifting other than as part of the costs taxed under
section 1920. If the Eastern Texas Plan were then read to be con-
sistent with Marek's interpretation of the existing legislation, it has
little or no application in suits to enforce federal law. 358 It would
be applied chiefly to induce settlement by parties in cases arising
under state law. This would be a blatant affront to the constitu-
tional principle expressed by Justices Field, Brandeis, and Holmes.
If and when Congress explicitly authorizes district courts to
trump state law with "the law of the district," it will be time
enough to decide whether it can do so. Meanwhile, it seems clear
that CJRA has conferred no such authority on those who promul-
gate plans under that statute.
CONCLUSION
At the outset of this discussion of the applicable law, I raised
six questions, a negative answer to any one of which was sufficient
to invalidate the provisions of the Eastern Texas Plan under dis-
cussion here. My own belief, expressed here, is that the correct
answers to each of the six questions are negative. Thus, the fee-
358. It is not clear that the Eastern Texas court means to be bound by Marek. One
may infer from its opinion in Friends of the Earth that its Plan applies to federal cases
brought for private benefit.
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shifting offer-of-settlement rule set forth in the Eastern Texas Plan
is not within the authority conferred by Congress on the district
court. It violates Sections 1652, 1920, and 2071 of Title 28 of the
United States Code. It is incidental that it also violates Federal
Rules 68 and 83. Moreover, if Congress had purported to confer
such power, its enactment might well be three times unconstitu-
tional. Friends of the Earth was therefore wrongly decided. The
correction of that error will likely come in time unless the Civil
Justice Reform Act and its ninety-four plans expire before the
issue is squarely presented to a court of appeals.
But that correction will be a mere skirmish in a larger strug-
gle, the struggle to ensure the fidelity of our courts to law. In
recent decades, many such skirmishes have been won by those
who prefer that the law be not too rigorously applied to them-
selves and who are therefore attracted to governance by decrees
measured to the length of each chancellor's foot. They have some-
times gained the support of some judges seeking to mass-produce
dispositions and other judges indulging idiosyncratic fancies such as
the Eastern Texas Plan.
It is time to reverse the trend. An opportunity to do so will
arise in 1997 when the reports on experience with the CJRA "ex-
periments" are in. The Judicial Conference should take that occa-
sion to sweep our national courts clear of all local clutter. A sug-
gestion is that the Civil Rules, at least, should be revised to elimi-
nate all authorizations for variations from or elaborations or en-
hancements of the national rules, especially those promulgated in
1993 to accommodate CJRA.
David Culberson might have proposed that a local rule should
be effective only if promulgated by the councils of the circuits
upon a finding that it is recommended by the district judges and is
responsive to a specified local need or serves a national need for
controlled experimentation to be conducted under the auspices of
the Federal Judicial Center. Each district judge would be permit-
ted to issue standing orders, but in recognition that such orders
are clutter, they would not be permitted to exceed a length stipu-
lated in the rules and should not be enforceable by any sanction
prejudicing the substantive rights of litigants. Congress, now as in
the time of Culberson, should favor such restraints and should
impose them if the Judicial Conference proves reluctant to do so.
Unrestrained localism in the federal courts is mischief serving no
purpose that Congress can honorably embrace.
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If such action is taken, it may serve as a first step in restoring
the professionalism of the federal courts. Whether it is or not,
there will be other opportunities, other skirmishes, and other
needs for correction. It is still true that in our republic, "law is
king. '35 9 Congressman Culberson, or his political descendants, of
whom, the reader will have detected, I am one, will again have
our day, and we will keep our judges bound to their duties to
ensure that the law is observed.
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